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ABSTRACT 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) is 
considered to be an intergovernmental policy at the European level and a domain of the 
executive at the national level. Yet, despite the prerogative of the executive, there is still 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP, but it has received little academic attention, although 
there is a growing debate about the democratic deficit of the policy that the Lisbon Treaty 
attempted to alleviate. This research offers insight into how national parliaments 
scrutinise CFSP by comparing the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Estonian Riigikogu 
and Finnish Eduskunta. Usually both are considered by the scholarly literature strong 
scrutinisers and both have similar formal powers and mandating-systems of CFSP 
scrutiny. Yet, similarities in the formal setup notwithstanding, there still seems to be a 
difference in how the two parliaments engage in CFSP scrutiny with Riigikogu described 
as a rubber stamp and Eduskunta an active policy shaper.  
This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the literature on parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU affairs has focused mostly on the formal powers that the parliaments have. In 
contrast this study concentrates not only on the legal rights and capabilities, but 
emphasises the role of the informal factors that affect the level of scrutiny of CFSP.  It 
argues that as CFSP is a EU policy with less automatic parliamentary scrutiny than other 
policy fields, informal factors such as attitude and willingness of the parliamentarians to 
engage in CFSP scrutiny and motivational factors play a more important role. Through 
expert interviews and the analytical framework developed by Born and Hänggi that takes 
into account authority, ability and attitude, this research concludes that attitude and the 
willingness of parliamentarians to engage in CFSP scrutiny explains the difference of the 
levels of scrutiny of CFSP of Riigikogu and Eduskunta. These findings support the new 
institutionalist theory of sociological institutionalism that emphasises the role of culture, 
role perception and institutional identity as determining the level of parliamentary 
scrutiny.  
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Holzhacker “parliamentary scrutiny is the exercise of power by the 
legislative branch to control, influence, or monitor government policy-making” 
(Holzhacker, 2008, p. 143). It provides democratic accountability to the decisions and 
actions of the executive. Research on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union (EU) policy-making has received more attention because of the democratic deficit 
debate about the accountability problem of EU decisions that the Lisbon Treaty that gave 
parliaments more instruments and control-mechanisms, was supposed to address. 
National parliaments have been labelled losers or victims of EU integration in the process 
of Europeanisation and as “latecomers” to adapting to the policy-making of the EU 
(Maurer & Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 1995). Others argue that national parliaments have 
responded to the empowerment of the EU and there has been a “parliamentary turn” or 
potential “parliamentarisation”, as national parliaments have improved their powers in 
their own political systems and also through parliamentary cooperation (Herranz-
Surralés, 2014; O’Brennan, 2007).  
The main function of national parliaments in the EU policy-making is to control their 
executives through parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the government members who 
represent member states in the meetings of the Council of the European Union (Council) 
and thereby to assure democratic legitimacy. As Hänggi put it “Scrutiny or oversight of 
the government is one of the most meaningful functions of parliament in modern 
democracies. It enables parliament to hold the government accountable for its activities, 
thereby helping to improve the quality of governance” (Born & Hänggi, 2004, p. 14). 
Riigikogu and Eduskunta both have the “mandating-model of scrutiny” with the 
involvement of specialised committees in EU policy scrutiny and policy-making 
(Buzogany, 2010, p. 4). In the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
the executive is represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who presents the 
government’s positions at the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) that deals 
with EU’ external action and foreign policy and implements CFSP (Council of the 
European Union, 2017). Both Foreign Affairs Committees usually support the position of 
the government when giving a mandate for the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the 
FAC meetings. 
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The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union is in many ways an 
exceptional EU policy with its “multifaceted” and “multilevel” nature. This means that it 
comprises a broad range of areas and entails both national and European levels 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 1). CFSP is one of those facets that is considered to be 
intergovernmental in nature and the domain of the executive and therefore has less 
parliamentary control. This means that decisions are taken and negotiations held at the 
government level between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at FAC meetings and national 
parliaments and European institutions representing the Community side are not that 
involved and it is considered to be a policy-field of high member state involvement at EU 
level.  Furthermore, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that introduced additional 
scrutiny mechanisms for national parliaments, generally do not apply to CFSP and 
research in that area offers an insight into how parliaments scrutinise non-legislative 
aspects of EU policy where scrutiny mechanisms are also usually less institutionalised 
(Huff, 2015, p. 396). This has raised a discussion about the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of this policy as it is also influenced by supranational actors like the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) (Sjursen, 2011a). There is no formal scrutiny 
mechanism for national parliaments to oversee the actions of the EEAS and its non-
transparent organisational structure makes effective scrutiny difficult (Huff, 2013, p. 6). 
According to Huff this calls into question the ability of even the parliaments with strong 
formal powers and mandating systems to hold their ministers accountable for FAC 
decisions (Huff, 2013, p. 7).  
Moreover, the European Parliament’s powers are limited in CFSP, which means that 
democratic scrutiny is exercised primarily by national parliaments through monitoring 
their government. Sjursen has even questioned the intergovernmental nature of that policy 
because of the expanding “transnational bureaucracy” that are making decisions beyond 
the reach of national parliaments (Sjursen, 2011b, p. 1072). She argues that terms like 
“supranational intergovernmentalism”, “Brussel-based intergovernmentalism” and 
“deliberative intergovernmentalism” clearly demonstrate that move away from the 
intergovernmental model, where governments are accountable to national parliaments 
(Sjursen, 2011a, p. 1081). Sjursen further discusses that in order for the CFSP to fit the 
audit democracy model, the role of national parliaments should be strengthened and 
integration scaled down (Sjursen, 2013, p. 149). Similarly, Christopher Lord claims that 
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even if the CFSP would be intergovernmental, there would still be more need for direct 
legitimation at the EU level (Lord, 2011, p. 1142).  Born and Hänggi have also written 
about the “double democratic deficit” in CFSP because of weak parliamentary control at 
the national level and lack of transparency and accountability at the EU level (Born & 
Hänggi, 2004). As there is structurally less parliamentary scrutiny in CFSP as in other 
EU policies, the legislative-executive relations in this policy field have according to some 
scholars received remarkably little attention (Huff, 2015, p. 396; Raunio, 2016a). This is 
despite the fact that for many parliaments, including the European Parliament (EP), CFSP 
is an important policy and they are actively looking for ways to influence and scrutinise 
it, which means that it merits more academic attention. Raube has demonstrated that the 
EP has been empowered despite incomplete treaties and it has tried to increase the 
accountability of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR) and the EEAS (Raube, 2015, p. 153). This study is therefore going to 
investigate factors that affect levels of scrutiny of CFSP. Despite these structural 
obstacles working against parliamentary scrutiny in this policy area, it does take place, 
especially in mandating system of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. Although Huff 
and Born and Hänggi have observed that levels of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP vary 
greatly among the EU member states  (Born & Hänggi, 2005; Huff, 2013). In order to 
understand this phenomenon, and to be able to recommend ways to close the democratic 
gap, it is necessary to look into the factors that produce such variation and this is what 
this study is going to do.  
So far the literature on parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs has focused on formal 
parliamentary rights and emphasised the importance of mandating rights, availability of 
information and resources available (Bergman, 1997; Pahre, 1997; Winzen, 2012). Yet, 
recently there has been a shift of focus in research about parliamentary scrutiny in EU 
policies from formal rules to informal factors that influence scrutiny strength. Auel shows 
that the presence of formal powers does not necessarily relate to actual parliamentary 
activity and there is a stark contrast between legal rights and how they are used in practice. 
She argues that “formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic 
of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little 
use of them” (Auel, 2007, p. 487). Born and Hänggi took this even further by claiming 
that while looking at parliamentary scrutiny in defence policy and parliamentary 
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accountability three factors should be taken into account: authority, ability and attitude 
(Born & Hänggi, 2004, pp. 11–15). Huff has taken this approach even further and 
employed these interlinked three concepts also in the context of CFSP. She criticises that 
too much attention has been paid on the formal powers in the research about 
parliamentary scrutiny and too little attention on how these powers are used in practise 
(Huff, 2013, p. 4). In her most recent research she argues using the analytical framework 
of “authority, ability and attitude” that attitude is the most important factor in explaining 
the variation in the strength of parliamentary scrutiny in CFSP (Huff, 2015, p. 396). I am 
going to follow up on the assertion and look at the role of informal factors in determining 
the level of engagement in CFSP parliamentary scrutiny.  
As foreign policy is usually decided behind closed doors and is more secretive than other 
policy fields, the parliamentary scrutiny in this field has also been less researched. In fact 
comparative research in the parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP has almost exclusively 
looked at only the parliamentary “war powers” (Raunio, 2016a, p. 315). This is also a 
policy field characterised by information asymmetry, as parliaments do not have the 
access to information that government members have who also attend Council meetings 
and this can affect the scrutiny of government and further complicates research (Kesgin 
& Kaarbo, 2010, p. 21). Taking this as the point of departure, I am going to follow up on 
this research, which suggests that in addition to formal powers and abilities, the 
willingness of parliamentarians to scrutinise is also an important factor in determining the 
engagement of parliamentarians in CFSP scrutiny. I am investigating this by looking at 
the cases of Estonian Riigikogu and Finnish Eduskunta that are similar in formal structure 
of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP.  
In the literature on Nordic parliaments, especially Denmark, Finland and Sweden are 
considered to have the strongest scrutiny powers in EU policies because of their 
mandating system (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 119; Neuhold, Hefftler, Rozenberg, 
& Smith, 2016, p. 670). This is also one of the reasons why Riigikogu, the Parliament of 
Estonia, took Eduskunta, the Parliament of Finland, as an example when creating its 
parliamentary scrutiny model of EU affairs after joining the European Union in 2004 
(Mõttus, Ernits, & Oja, 2012, p. 460). As a consequence of modelling the Estonian 
institutional setup after the Finnish model, Riigikogu and Eduskunta have very similar 
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strong formal scrutiny powers in EU policies including in the area of CFSP.1 As a result, 
not only the broad context factors are relatively similar, they are both small states in EU 
level, generally considered to be pro-integration with a tradition of consensual foreign 
policy, but also at the institutional level, both have specialised committees involved in 
EU scrutiny with the Foreign Affairs Committees responsible for parliamentary scrutiny 
of CFSP.  
Both countries, Estonia and Finland also officially support a strong Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and have “working parliaments”, which means that emphasis is on work 
carried out in parliamentary committees. According to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland, the EU must be an active global player and strong CFSP is a key instrument 
of that and a channel for Finland to exert its influence (The Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland, 2015). According to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context 
of CFSP “Estonia’s objective is a strong and united European Union. The increasing 
integration of the EU strengthens the feeling of togetherness and allows to be better 
protected against security threats. Internally integrated European Union is also more 
capable and influential in its external activities” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2017). Estonia’s support for a strong and united CFSP was also evident when sanctions 
were imposed on Russia in 2014 over its military intervention in Ukraine. Although 
Estonia is one of the countries that is worst affected by the decrease of trade with Russia, 
it is one of the most ardent supporters of a united EU response and maintaining the 
sanctions until Minsk agreement is fulfilled or even strengthening them if necessary 
(Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2017). Estonia and Finland 
also have very similar political systems. Although Finland has a semi-presidential system 
and foreign policy leadership is shared between the President and government, EU affairs 
including CFSP is the responsibility of the government like in Estonia. Both countries 
also have a tradition of majority coalition governments and the nature of the opposition 
                                                
1 When developing a system of scrutiny of EU affairs, Estonia took Denmark and Finland as models because 
of their strong parliamentary oversight mechanisms. There was also close cooperation and information 
exchange between the civil servants of the Riigikogu and Eduskunta during the time of accession. A 
distinctive characteristic of the system of Eduskunta is the involvement of specialised committees in 
scrutiny of EU affairs and it is more flexible than the Danish system where there is also a tradition of 
minority governments. While in Folketinget the European Affairs Committee is also responsible for the 
scrutiny of CFSP, Riigikogu took over the system of Eduskunta where the Foreign Affairs Committee 
scrutinises CFSP.  
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has been quite fragmented, which would assume that it is also easier for the government 
to push through its will in the parliament.  Although Estonia is a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Finland is not, it should not make a crucial 
difference in CFSP scrutiny as both countries as small states are supporters of deepening 
and strengthening cooperation in foreign policy issues between the EU member states.  
While these institutional factors suggest similarity in terms of scrutiny, in practice, this is 
not the case. For example, the Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the 
European Union studied comprehensively all EU national parliaments and in the country 
reports Riigikogu was described as “a watchdog that does not bark” and the Finnish 
parliament was found to be a government watchdog and a policy shaper (Neuhold et al., 
2016, pp. 423, 527). Riigikogu has often been described as a “rubber stamp” in the eyes 
of the government and in Estonian media and by politician themselves that just seals 
decision made by the government (Ehin, 2015, p. 526; Karnau, 2011; The Foundation 
Estonian Cooperation Assembly, 2015). The latter claim of the Estonian parliament being 
more passive in the use of its scrutinising powers, is also echoed in the literature on the 
EU scrutiny practice of the Riigikogu in general. Riigikogu is one of the least active 
parliaments in the EU to use the instruments of subsidiarity and the political Dialogue 
(Ehin, 2015, p. 523). On the other hand, according to Raunio, the Finnish government 
emphasises the role of Eduskunta in providing democratic legitimacy to EU policy-
making (Raunio, 2015, p. 407). The Eduskunta has also argued that the position approved 
by the parliament is the only Finnish position at the EU level (Raunio, 2015, p. 417). In 
the light of similar institutional settings, but pronounced difference with regard to scrutiny 
in practice, this raises the question of factors that influence the strength of parliamentary 
scrutiny if all formal powers to exercise it are present and relatively similar.  
This research is important also in the wider context of the debate on the deepening and 
widening of the EU foreign and security policy and the role of member states and national 
parliaments in CFSP as an intergovernmental policy field. The objective of my research 
is to identify what factors influence and shape levels of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. 
For this purpose, this study seeks to answer the question comparing the cases of Riigikogu 
and Eduskunta as “most similar” cases given that both have similar strong formal scrutiny 
powers and parliamentary setup for scrutinising CFSP. Also, research of parliamentary 
scrutiny in EU policies has up to now concentrated on investigating the variations in 
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parliamentary scrutiny models of different EU member states, but there is no research on 
comparing the differences between strong scrutinisers with strong formal powers and the 
differences in scrutiny practice. The comparison of two cases, which are similar in their 
formal setting allows me to identify informal factors, most importantly attitude. I will be 
especially concentrating on the motives of the Members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committees of the Riigikogu and the Eduskunta to scrutinise or not and how the 
politicians see their role and the role of their parliament in CFSP. For this purpose, I 
conducted extensive semi-structured interviews with former and current Members of the 
Foreign Affairs Committees of both countries. The sample includes both members of the 
opposition and members of the coalition and a member of the Committee staff. I will 
particularly focus on the importance of attitude in impacting parliamentary scrutiny in 
CFSP relying on the frameworks developed by Born and Hänggi (2004) and Huff (2013) 
and drawing on, broadly, a sociological institutionalist approach. My aim is to see 
whether attitude and/or willingness of the Members of Parliament (MP) to scrutinise 
influences the level of parliamentary scrutiny in CFSP and how parliamentarians actually 
perceive the quality and effectiveness of their own scrutiny efforts. Following their 
account of parliamentary scrutiny, and the emphasis on the role of informal 
factors/attitude (awareness and willingness) in particular, two hypotheses are put forward 
in order to test the influence of attitude on levels of scrutiny: 
H1: The more parliamentarians conceive of their role as giving effect to 
parliamentary control, the higher levels of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP affairs. 
H2: The higher the willingness of parliamentarians to exert parliamentary control, 
the higher levels of scrutiny of CFSP affairs. 
Everything else being equal (formal factors), parliaments with higher attitude as well as 
higher levels of willingness will exercise higher levels of parliamentary scrutiny in CFSP 
affairs. The time frame of my research is post-Lisbon Treaty (December 2009-) as this 
established the current framework of CFSP and mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny.  
It is also the first comparative study of Riigikogu and Eduskunta and their scrutiny of 
CFSP. As it is a policy area with weaker scrutiny mechanisms than other EU policy areas 
and generally the scrutiny procedures available for the EU legislation do not apply for 
CFSP, it is especially important to research what are the factors that motivate the MPs to 
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scrutinise it. Also in the CFSP the intergovernmental nature has remained, which means 
that parliaments with mandating systems should have a direct way of influencing the 
actions of the government in CFSP. However, informal factors like attitude and 
willingness are very difficult to measure and research, which from the outset is 
understood to pose a limitation of my investigation. I circumvent this problem by relying 
on interviews, which provide the information from practice and from personal perceptions 
of politicians and longtime staff members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Another 
obstacle in investigating this policy field is that foreign and security issues are usually 
considered sensitive information and the Foreign Affairs Committee meetings of 
Eduskunta and Riigikogu also take place behind closed doors, so it is difficult to get 
information and get politicians to agree to an in-depth interview. Another limitation could 
be that Estonian members had the advantage of giving an interview in their mother 
language, but as the interviews with the Finnish MPs were held in English, they might 
have had more difficulties in expressing their ideas clearly in a foreign language.  
In the following section I will give an overview of the Europeanisation, 
parliamentarisation and deparliamentarisation as more specific contributions to the debate 
on the role of national parliaments in EU affairs. Thereafter, I will look into the debate 
on the democratic deficit of CFSP at the European level and will give an overview of the 
academic debate on the formal and informal factors that influence the level of 
parliamentary scrutiny. I will embed this discussion into the wider debate on the new 
institutionalist theories and their explanations of parliamentary scrutiny as they emphasise 
the role of institutions, culture and role perception in determining the levels of 
parliamentary scrutiny and thus emphasise the informal factors that affect parliamentary 
scrutiny. Then I am going to use the analytical framework of “authority, ability and 
attitude” developed by Born and Hänggi and use the comparative method of “most similar 
systems” to compare the formal and informal practices of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
of the Foreign Affairs Committees of Riigikogu and Eduskunta.  
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THEORIES OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY 
Europeanisation, deparliamentarisation and parliamentarisation 
The approaches of Europeanisation, de-parliamentarisation or parliamentarisation look at 
the wider context of the role of national parliaments in the EU policy-making and thus 
offer insights into the debate about parliamentary scrutiny and motivation factors to 
scrutinise. Europeanisation in the context on parliamentary scrutiny means national 
adaptation to the EU level and institutionalisation of European norms and values and 
pursuing foreign policy on EU level. In the context of parliamentary scrutiny, it 
diminishes the role and impact of national parliaments as Europeanisation is claimed to 
have decreased the role of parliaments as more decisions are made at EU level and they 
are the passive victims of integration (O’Brennan, 2007). This has also led to the 
deparliamentarisation thesis that also argues that parliaments are increasingly 
marginalised in the EU policy-process as they have had to give powers away to the EU 
level that were previously under their jurisdiction (O’Brennan, 2007, p. 4). This has also 
led to loss of power from the legislative to the executive as government members are in 
a more dominant position and have more interaction with the EU level (O’Brennan, 2007, 
p. 6). Kassim has further observed that in the context of parliamentary scrutiny this means 
that parliaments have very little opportunity to scrutinise EU proposals, influence the 
content or direct the actions of their governments (Kassim, 2000, p. 258). In the context 
of parliamentary scrutiny is also important that there has been a transfer of decision-
making authority from the legislative to the executive through decisions made at the 
Council of Ministers (Holzhacker, 2008, p. 142). These approaches downplay the impact 
of parliaments and the importance of parliamentary scrutiny in the EU political system.  
On the other hand, there are scholars who argue for parliamentarisation that actually 
especially after the Lisbon Treaty the scrutiny possibilities of national parliaments have 
increased and they are influential players in the EU policy-making process. According to 
them, national parliaments have learned to fight back and have gained greater 
participation rights in EU policy-making (Auel, Tacea, & Rozenberg, 2015). Parliaments 
have adapted to new scrutiny models to better control EU policies and oversee the 
government actions and have reformed their rules of procedure accordingly (Strom, 
Müller, & Bergman, 2003). O’Brennan and Raunio argue that parliaments have also 
  15 
increased interparliamentary cooperation in EU policies and in general MPs value more 
the importance of EU affairs (O’Brennan, 2007, p. 26). This approach sees the 
parliaments gaining power in the EU context because of the democratic deficit debate and 
accountability problems that have shifted the focus back on the role of national 
parliaments. My research gives an insight into how parliamentarians themselves see the 
role of national parliaments and their impact on EU policies and if they perceive the 
existence of democratic deficit in CFSP. As I will look into how the two parliaments 
engage in scrutiny of CFSP, the findings should also indicate if in the context of Riigikogu 
and Eduskunta we can talk about their marginalisation or parliamentarisation.  
The democratic deficit of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the European 
level  
In addition to the national level where foreign policy is considered the domain of the 
executive, the democratic deficit debate is also raised at the European level because of 
the small role of the European Parliament in CFSP. EP only really has the budgetary 
power and according to the Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has to “regularly 
consult” the EP on CFSP issues and “ensure that the views of the European Parliament 
are duly taken into consideration” (European Union, 2007). According to Huff this 
democratic deficit could only be overcome through more effective interparliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament, although any 
attempt made by the EP to gain power in CFSP is seen as a threat by national parliaments 
to the intergovernmental nature of the policy (Huff, 2013, pp. 20–21). Raube tackles the 
question of democratic deficit of CFSP on EU level and demonstrated that the EEAS is 
subjected to parliamentary scrutiny by the EP, although it might not be adequate oversight 
due the limited powers given to the EP in EU treaties (Raube, 2015). The EP has gained 
co-legislation rights in the financing and staffing of EEAS and consultation right on the 
organisation and functioning of EEAS. However, it has managed to gain more powers 
and influence than given to it by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), CFSP still remains largely beyond 
parliamentary control (Raube, 2015, p. 145). This is why Huff also emphasises the 
importance of researching the factors that influence the MP’s willingness to scrutinise 
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CFSP as there also seems to be no direct correlation between parliament’s formal powers 
and willingness to use these powers (Huff, 2013, p. 21). She argues that the case of the 
European Parliament illustrates the importance of attitude in parliamentary scrutiny, 
which can even lead to more authority and ability, as the EP is very interested in CFSP 
scrutiny despite its lack of formal powers, which has led to more involvement in CFSP 
(Huff, 2013, p. 19). 
Formal and informal factors that influence parliamentary scrutiny 
There are different theoretical approaches to studying the levels of parliamentary scrutiny 
in EU policy-making and the factors that influence it. The most common one is the 
principal-agent theory that is based on the process of delegation and accountability and 
looks at the delegation of power from the principal (parliament) to the agent 
(government).  According to that theory there is information asymmetry between the two 
actors in favour of the agent and the latter will always try to maximise his interest instead 
of that of the principal. In the context of parliamentary scrutiny it focuses on the 
institutional control mechanisms and formal powers of the parliament in order to control 
the government and on the possible agency loss (Sanchez de Dios, 2014, pp. 12–13). 
Martin and Vanberg argue in that framework that coalition government parties use 
parliamentary scrutiny to avoid that the certain minister pursues policies favoured by their 
own party at the expense of coalition partners  (Martin & Vanberg, 2004, p. 13). 
Parliamentary scrutiny can also be studied through the game theory that focuses on the 
competition between different actors and how coalition formation affects scrutiny levels 
(Sanchez de Dios, 2014, p. 11). The formalistic approach concentrates on the importance 
of formal and structural powers in determining the level of parliamentary scrutiny 
(Sanchez de Dios, 2014, p. 2). Constructivists emphasise the importance of ideas, values 
and identity and thus focus on the informal factors like roles and the social setting 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 326). In the context of CFSP in addition to the formal 
structural powers, they would look at the strength of European and institutional identity. 
Maurer and Wessels conducted the first comprehensive comparative research on how the 
role of national parliaments was impacted by the EU integration in the EU-15 and 
emphasised the institutional structure and formal powers (Maurer & Wessels, 2001). As 
a result, it received criticism for its unilateral approach that ignores how these formal 
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powers are used and other informal factors that influence scrutiny strength. New-
institutionalist approach emphasises the importance of willingness of using the formal 
powers in determining the level of scrutiny (Auel, 2005). In some cases, willingness by 
the parliament to scrutinise the government is even more important than formal powers 
(Auel & Benz, 2005). According to Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea “national parliaments are 
complex institutions, made up of individuals faced with a number of different 
opportunities, constraints and incentives. Institutional capacities are thus not necessarily 
automatically translated into behaviour” (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015, p. 283). 
Bono’s findings also show that the formal powers of parliaments cannot fully account for 
the practice of scrutiny (Bono, 2005, p. 220). MacCarthaigh emphasises the importance 
of domestic political culture in influencing the level of scrutiny in practice. Rozenberg 
argues that emotional incentives and role perceptions of MPs are also important factors 
in influencing parliamentary involvement in EU affairs (Auel, Tacea, et al., 2015, p. 65). 
O’Brennan and Raunio also admit that although different treaties have enhanced the 
powers of national parliaments, it still depends on the national MPs themselves how and 
to what extent they wish to scrutinise EU affairs (O’Brennan, 2007, pp. 32–33). 
Neo-institutionalism and its approaches to parliamentary scrutiny 
The three neo-institutionalist schools of thought – historical institutionalism, rational 
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism developed in response to 
behavioural perspectives and seek to demonstrate the role of institutions in determining 
social and political outcomes. Rational choice institutionalists emphasise the importance 
of formal structures in determining engagement in parliamentary scrutiny, historical 
institutionalists emphasise the role of institutions themselves with formal and informal 
factors and sociological institutionalists stress the importance of informal factors. 
Paradoxically these three schools of thought developed independently from each other. 
According to Hall and Taylor historical institutionalism emphasises the importance of 
formal institutions and their power to structure collective behaviour and influence 
distinctive outcomes. Much of their research concentrates on the way political institutions 
structure relations among different actors like the legislative, executive, interest groups 
and the electorate. They define institutions through their formal and informal rules and 
norms and they tend to see institutional development as path dependent. According to this 
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view institutions affect the identities and preferences of actors and the individual is seen 
as “an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts 
and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, 
out of which a course of action is constructed”. It has devoted less attention than other 
branches of new institutionalism to developing an explanation of how exactly institutions 
affect the behaviour of actors  (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 936–942). Its criticism is that 
historical institutionalists have not managed to add their findings into systemic theories 
about processes involved in institutional creation and change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 
955).  
Rational choice institutionalism grew out from a study of American congressional 
behaviour and the role of the Congress as an institution in Congressional outcomes. It 
looked at theories of agency in explaining how the Congress structures its relations with 
its committees and regulatory agencies. Rational choice institutionalists presume that 
actors will behave in a strategic manner that maximises their interests. They see 
institutions as structuring interactions and leading actors towards a particular outcome by 
limiting choices and providing mechanisms for action (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 942–
946). Rational choice institutionalists have also demonstrated the importance of 
information and  strategic interaction between actors for power relations and political 
outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 951). Although this approach has a precise conception 
for explaining how institutions affect individuals, it has been criticised for being too 
simplistic in describing human motivation (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 951). It does not also 
explain the causes of inefficiency of some institutions and it tends to assume that the 
process of institutional creation and its effects are under the control of actors (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 952).    
Sociological institutionalism grew out of organisational theory in the 1970s and was a 
counter reaction to the emphasis on the formal and rational side of institutions that 
concentrate on efficiency. Sociologists see institutions more broadly than political 
scientists and view culture and factors associated with it like morals and symbol systems 
as important elements in how institutions affect actors. According to Hall and Taylor 
sociological institutions argue that “many of these forms and practices should be seen as 
culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, 
and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends 
  19 
efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of 
cultural practices more generally”. They see institutions as influencing not only the 
behaviour of actors but also their preferences and identities. Moreover, individuals 
internalise their institutional roles and the norms associated with it and institutions 
determine also the possible course of action for the actors and make them behave in 
socially appropriate ways. Sociological institutionalism does not deny that actors can be 
rational but they argue that this is socially constituted what rational choice institutionalists 
take as given and institutions can affect the preferences or identities of actors (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, pp. 946–950). It explains the best way out of new institutionalists theories 
the existence of inefficiencies in institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 953). At the same 
time, it can ignore the importance of power relations in determining individual behaviour 
or institutional change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954).  
Three neo-institutional theories: rational choice, historical and sociological 
institutionalism, have their own explanations of parliamentary scrutiny. Rational choice 
institutionalism emphasises the importance of government type, party splits and 
bargaining power in determining the strength and ability to scrutinise. According to this 
view conflicts within the parliament influence government type and the higher the level 
of conflict, the stronger the level of scrutiny (Buzogany, 2010, p. 9). This approach also 
looks at the bargaining powers of member states at Council meetings and claims that as 
small countries generally have weaker bargaining powers, they develop better 
parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms so that their governments have more influence on the 
European level by being able to block decisions (Buzogany, 2010, p. 10). Rationalist 
explanation to parliamentary scrutiny is also that parliamentarians have limited time 
resources in their hands and have to consider the costs and benefits of spending time on 
EU affairs (Auel, Tacea, et al., 2015, p. 65). Moreover MPs are rational and they are more 
willing to scrutinise EU affairs, if they have the institutional means for it (Auel, 
Rozenberg, et al., 2015, p. 300). Historical institutionalism concentrates on parliamentary 
and committee strength and accession timing as the most important factors influencing 
parliamentary scrutiny strength. This approach sees the parliament’s ability to scrutinise 
on EU level as dependent on the ability to scrutinise on domestic level (Buzogany, 2010, 
p. 10). Sociological institutionalist approach looks at political culture, salience of 
European issues and public opinion towards the EU as determining the level of 
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parliamentary scrutiny (Buzogany, 2010, p. 10). Raunio emphasises the importance of 
Eurosceptic public opinion, which usually leads to stronger scrutiny mechanisms by the 
parliament to control the government more effectively (Raunio, 2005).  
Auel and Christiansen found based on neo-institutionalist approaches that institutional 
capacities and political motivation explain best parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
They find that “to explain the nature, direction and intensity of parliamentary 
involvement, the motivation of individual Members of Parliament and parliamentary 
party groups to become involved needs to be studied, and the preferences, incentives and 
driving forces that guide their actions ought to be examined” (Auel & Christiansen, 2015, 
p. 264). According to them parliamentarians are rational actors and institutions provide a 
context for what is deemed as appropriate behaviour. Thus, parliamentary behaviour is 
affected by the formal and informal rules and norms and parliamentary culture. (Auel & 
Christiansen, 2015, p. 265). MPs are motivated by electoral benefits and possible policy 
impact and public opinion on EU issues can provide an incentive for scrutiny (Auel & 
Christiansen, 2015, p. 270). In addition to domestic level, also institutional environment 
at the EU level should be studied.  
The sociological institutionalism looks at the role of norms and values in motivating 
parliamentarians to engage in scrutiny. An important factor is parliamentary and political 
culture and how EU scrutiny is influenced by general parliamentary traditions. These 
parliamentary norms can determine what is considered appropriate behaviour and 
whether there is a cooperative or confrontational culture between the executive and the 
legislative influences the way scrutiny is exercised. (Auel & Christiansen, 2015, p. 271). 
Sprungk argues that a confrontation with the executive might not be considered 
appropriate behaviour in the parliamentary culture where there is a cooperative 
relationship between the government and the parliament and this might hinder intensive 
scrutiny. She also says that the attitude of the MP towards EU might impact the 
willingness to exercise EU scrutiny as a party that supports EU integration might consider 
parliamentary scrutiny as inappropriate and harmful (Sprungk, 2003). Wessels has 
demonstrated the importance of the perception of MPs about the importance of 
parliamentary functions, how democratic legitimacy is achieved in the EU and the role of 
national parliaments in EU policy-making as factors influencing motivation to scrutinise 
(Wessels, 2005). Blomgren and Rozenberg have looked at “parliamentary roles” that in 
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addition to individual beliefs and ideas articulate collective norms and values as factors 
that influence the behaviour of MPs (Rozenberg & Blomgren, 2012, p. 211). What this 
means is that in the light of the new institutionalism debate, each strand emphasises 
different kinds of factors. By looking into explanatory role of attitude and willingness, 
the present study contributes to this debate by showing the importance of role perceptions 
and institutional culture and identity as determining how actively parliaments engage in 
CFSP scrutiny.  
Authority, ability and attitude 
The comparative framework was first developed by Born and Hänggi in the context of 
defence policy by evaluating parliaments on the basis of three criteria: authority, ability 
and attitude (Born & Hänggi, 2004). They argue that these three concepts are interlinked 
and equally important in determining the level of scrutiny. Both formal and informal 
powers are important as authority is contingent on the ability and on the political will. 
This framework allows for in-depth comparison of parliamentary scrutiny practices and 
explains the variation. Huff took this approach further and used it in the context of CFSP 
and CSDP (Huff, 2013). She also argues that in research ability and attitude have received 
less systematic attention than authority (Huff, 2013, p. 9). In her more recent research she 
argues that in this framework attitude, meaning the willingness of the MPs to scrutinise 
is the most important factor in explaining the variation in the levels of scrutiny of national 
parliaments specifically in CFSP. Furthermore, Huff argues that the attitude of MPs is 
especially important in the context of the CFSP, as it is a policy area which is in 
comparison with other EU policies less institutionalised and less automatic in terms of 
parliamentary scrutiny. Thus, it also offers an insight into the factors that motivate MPs 
to scrutinise or not and how parliaments control the activities of government in non-
legislative aspects of EU-policy (Huff, 2015, p. 396). She also states that there is almost 
no empirical or comparative data on how parliaments scrutinise CFSP and especially the 
questions of sufficient time, resources and the interest of MPs to scrutinise (Huff, 2015, 
p. 398).  
Authority refers to the formal powers that the parliament has to legislate on foreign policy 
and scrutinise the government. Born and Hänggi look at the legislative, budgetary, 
elective, representative and scrutiny and oversight functions in determining whether a 
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parliament has strong or weak powers. They look at parliamentary powers in the context 
of the use of force under international auspices and look at the ability of the parliaments 
to give a binding mandate (ex ante), troop dispatch (ex ante), post hoc 
questioning/inquiry, budget veto over individual missions and ability to amend or veto 
overall foreign policy budget (Born & Hänggi, 2004, p. 12). According to Huff who 
applied Born and Hänggi’s framework to CFSP, the ability to give a mandate to ministers 
before Council meetings is the most potent instrument for parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
(Huff, 2015, p. 401). Parliaments with a mandate system have a higher level of formal 
authority as their governments are obliged to stick to the mandate and are accountable to 
the parliament.  
In Born and Hänggi’s framework ability means whether the parliament is capable of 
exercising their formal powers. They believe that a prerequisite of effective parliamentary 
scrutiny in the field of security policy is the involvement of a specialised committee that 
demonstrates the institutionalisation of parliamentary oversight in that policy field and 
increase the ability of the parliament to influence the government. Also important is that 
this  specialised committee has administrative and expert support, as well as access to 
information and the timing of that information (Born & Hänggi, 2005, pp. 5–9). They 
argue that formal powers are not enough for effective parliamentary scrutiny, unless they 
are accompanied by sufficient resources, staff support and expertise (Born & Hänggi, 
2004, p. 14). Parliaments have various ways to fulfil their oversight function like 
questioning, interpellation, debates, hearings and inquiries, but effective oversight is not 
possible without full and accurate information (Born & Hänggi, 2004, p. 14). Another 
important indicator regarding information rights is access to information by the members 
of the opposition. The last one is especially important because of the closed nature of 
foreign and security policy that can exclude the opposition. The size of the committee 
staff is vital for effective scrutiny but the size of the committee does not have a linear 
impact on the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight in CFSP (Born & Hänggi, 2005, 
pp. 9–10).  
By attitude Born and Hänggi mean assessing the parliament’s attitude towards security 
policy scrutiny (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 11). They argue that all formal powers and 
capacities are meaningless without the willingness of parliamentarians to use these 
powers to scrutinise the government. They also admit that attitude is very difficult to 
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evaluate and it requires extensive qualitative analysis (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 11). Huff 
also agrees and admits that this is also the reason why this concept has received almost 
no academic attention and no attempt has been made to develop a systematic approach 
towards how attitude can be applied to CFSP and CSDP (Huff, 2013, p. 15). In assessing 
attitude Born and Hänggi emphasise the broader context of the perception of parliament 
about its role in relation to the government (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 11). According to 
Huff empirical evidence suggests that MPs who do not see themselves as scrutinisers of 
the foreign and security policy and see it as the domain of the executive, are also less 
likely to put effort into scrutinising CFSP (Huff, 2015, p. 406). Born and Hänggi also 
emphasise the political salience of security issues as determining the engagement in 
parliamentary scrutiny (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 11). Huff argues that more 
systematically attitude can be viewed as the attitude of parliaments towards CFSP 
scrutiny in the context of their approach to EU affairs in general. (Huff, 2013, p. 9). It is 
in the end up to the individual parliaments and politicians how they choose to use the 
formal powers and capabilities available for them in CFSP scrutiny and whether to invest 
time and resources into CFSP scrutiny and if they see it as an important policy field.  
Born and Hänggi see as a limiting factor of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP the fact that 
security issues do not generally figure high on the public agenda and are not viewed as of 
great importance from electoral point of view (Born & Hänggi, 2004, p. 15). Literature 
on CFSP parliamentary scrutiny also says that domestic issues usually matter more for 
voters than foreign policy, which could impact the willingness of parliamentarians to 
scrutinise or the quality of scrutiny (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 21). Born and Hänggi 
emphasise the demand by public opinion as determining the level of parliamentary 
scrutiny in security issues. (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 11). According to the sociological 
institutionalist approach the strength of parliamentary scrutiny depends on the public 
opinion about the EU. Raunio argues that a more Eurosceptic public will result in tighter 
parliamentary scrutiny as the MPs as representatives of the electorate have a stronger 
incentive to control the actions of the government (Auel, Rozenberg, et al., 2015, p. 287).  
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METHODOLOGY 
The comparative method was chosen for this research, as Eduskunta and Riigikogu are 
both strong scrutinisers and with similar formal powers, yet there seems to be a difference 
in their scrutiny strength in practice and the ability to influence EU policies. So, the form 
of comparative explanation chosen is the “most similar systems” research design 
proposed by Przeworski and Teune where cases with many similar features are chosen, 
which then cannot be accountable for causing the differences between the cases (Hopkin, 
2010, p. 292). The cases of Estonia and Finland were chosen for their similarity of the 
formal parliamentary scrutiny powers in CFSP, which should better demonstrate the 
influence of informal factors in determining the difference of the level of parliamentary 
scrutiny of CFSP. This is the reason I did not choose to compare a weak and a strong 
scrutiniser, but two strong scrutinisers with similar formal powers and to see if there is a 
difference in how they use these powers in practice. A limitation of the “most similar 
systems” comparison design in my research is the “too many variables, too few countries” 
problem as it is difficult to find countries that are so similar in their scrutiny design that 
they could be compared for differences and there are still many variables that could 
account for the difference (Hopkin, 2010, p. 293). 
In order to initially establish overall levels of EU scrutiny, I am relying on the data of the 
Observatory of Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty (OPAL) research on the overall 
scrutiny of EU affairs in Eduskunta and Riigikogu, their scores of institutional strength 
and activity in EU affairs and country reports. OPAL is a joint project dedicated to the 
research on the role of national parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect and 
is the most comprehensive and in-depth qualitative research of the EU parliaments in EU 
scrutiny. One of the priorities of the project was also to create a ranking that would not 
only focus on institutional provisions and formal rules. I go beyond that, by looking at 
scrutiny in practice and more specifically how informal factors such as attitude and 
willingness influence the practice of parliamentary scrutiny.   
In comparing Eduskunta’s and Riigikogu’s engagement in CFSP scrutiny the analytical 
framework developed by Born and Hänggi that they used for comparing the parliamentary 
accountability of the use of force under international auspices will be used. They believe 
that the parliamentary scrutiny depends on its powers, capacity and willingness to hold 
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the government accountable. Bruce George, a Member of the British House of Commons 
and former President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) used in this context the important factors of authority, 
ability and attitude that Born and Hänggi adopted for their comparative framework (Born 
& Hänggi, 2005, pp. 3–4). There is little research on the parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
and few attempts made at comparing different countries have used this framework (Huff 
2013), because it is a comprehensive analytical framework that looks at both formal and 
informal factors and offers comparable data. It also accounts for each legislature’s unique 
institutional arrangements and culture (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 5). A disadvantage is 
that this framework best explains variation among the different models of scrutiny applied 
by the EU member states, but has not been used before to compare two strong scrutinisers 
with the same mandating systems.  
Post-Lisbon Treaty time frame 
The time frame of this research is post-Lisbon Treaty that entered into force 1 December 
2009. The main focus is on the last two parliamentary terms, as there were parliamentary 
elections in both Estonia and Finland in the spring of 2011 and 2015. Some MPs 
interviewed and the Estonian staff member were already working at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee also in 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty took effect. The Lisbon Treaty was an 
attempt to create a more democratic approach towards EU decision-making and intended 
to increase the role of national parliaments and introduced the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. The Lisbon Treaty established the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) as 
one of the configurations of the Council of the EU by separating it from the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council and confirmed the intergovernmental character of 
CFSP. It also changed the institutional framework of CFSP as the position of the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action 
Service were created (Official website of the European Union, 2016). Moreover, a new 
format of interparliamentary scrutiny of CFSP was put in place — the Interparliamentary 
Conference on the CFSP and CSDP.  National parliaments also gained better and earlier 
access to information and documentation from the Commission, draft European 
legislative acts and agendas and the outcome of meetings of the Council (Official Journal 
of the European Union  EUR-Lex, 2012). The role of national parliaments in the EU 
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policy-making and the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU scrutiny has also been in the 
centre of researchers’ attention. So, the reason for choosing the post-Lisbon Treaty as a 
time frame of this study is that it established the current EU institutional framework and 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. 
Semi-structured expert interviews 
Interviews were conducted to get insight into the factors that motivate parliamentarians 
to scrutinise CFSP, how important are the issues for Members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and their electorate and how do they see their role as scrutinisers. There is 
actually no previous such detailed research on what factors influence and motivate the 
parliamentarians to engage in parliamentary scrutiny of specifically CFSP. Only through 
interviews informal factors are accessible and levels of scrutiny in practice established. 
In the interviews, I will also look at motivational and attitude indicators that have not 
been looked at before like the attitude of the Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the attitude of the Minister towards the 
Committee. I will also look at how important the MPs consider EU affairs in general, 
before asking about the importance of CFSP issues for the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and their electorate. I will also look at the role perception of MPs how they see the role 
of national parliaments in EU policy-making and how democratic legitimacy is achieved. 
I also have specific questions about ability like access to information and if MPs feel the 
information asymmetry with the government and if there are any factors that hinder the 
Foreign Affairs Committee members to exercise parliamentary scrutiny.  
In choosing the interviewees both members of opposition and coalition were interviewed 
(Riigikogu: Estonian Centre Party, Estonian Reform Party, Social Democratic Party, 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union; Eduskunta: 
Centre Party, Green League, Social Democratic Party of Finland, The Finns Party, 
National Coalition Party) and politicians who are longtime members of the Committee 
(who have served more than one legislative term), new members (who are serving their 
first legislative term) and some members who are previous Members of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and who have had different positions in the Committee (Member, 
Vice-Chairman, Chairman). In addition to MPs also longtime Heads of Secretariats of the 
Foreign Affairs Committees of both parliaments were interviewed (Riigikogu since 2001; 
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Eduskunta 2001-2007, 2010-2015). As foreign policy is a policy area where sensitive 
information is handled and committee discussions and decisions take place behind closed 
doors and both politicians and civil servants are careful in their sayings, confidentiality 
was agreed upon. Although the list of interviewees is public and included in the 
bibliography and Appendix 1 provides more specific information about the positions, 
political affiliation and experience in the Foreign Affairs Committee, in order to allow 
the respondents to speak freely and honestly, no one is cited by name. Numbers or any 
other codes of differentiation are also not used in citing the interviewees as the sample 
number is small enough and to avoid the possibility of recognition and to guarantee the 
confidentiality of interviewees.  Moreover, in the analysis the general impressions and 
comparisons about the Foreign Affairs Committees of both countries are more important 
in the context of this research than quotes by specific people.  The interviews lasted from 
45 minutes to an hour and a half. In total 14 people were interviewed, seven from 
Riigikogu and seven from Eduskunta. Interviews with Estonian MPs and a staff member 
were conducted in Estonian (Appendix 3) and with Finnish MPs and a staff member in 
English (Appendix 2).   
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as a data collecting method, as they provide 
comparable data and are recommended, when the respondents are busy, high-status 
people and the research topic deals with sensitive information (Mahoney, 1997). They are 
also used when the research topic is complex and very detailed information is needed and 
also allow for extra questions that raise during the interviews. An advantage of semi-
structured interviews is that the interviewer does not have to follow a rigid form, free and 
open responses are encouraged and respondents’ perceptions can be captured in their own 
words (Mahoney, 1997). One form of semi-structured interviews are expert interviews 
with people who have special knowledge that is related to their profession. Expert 
interviews give access to information that would be difficult to obtain by other methods 
and it allows for a thorough understanding of the topic and to investigate the causes 
(Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009, p. 2). According to Littig an expert is among other things 
a person who is responsible for the implementation or control of policies and who has 
access to information about decision processes. Expert interviews are about a person’s 
special knowledge and experiences, which result from a status within an institution 
(Littig, 2013). If the expertise in a particular occupational or professional field is central 
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to the area of research, then the interview can be regarded as an expert interview (Bogner 
& Menz, 2005, p. 46). MPs also belong to the elite that are a special group of experts but 
according to Littig elite and expert interview forms overlap and it seems that the variance 
lies in differing social and political sciences research traditions and interests (Littig, 2009, 
p. 98).  
The questionnaire starts with a general introductory question and consists of three blocks: 
the role of national parliaments in EU policy-making, parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
and academic literature and other actors in CFSP. In compiling the questions, it was taken 
into account that the questions move from more general ones about the perception of the 
role of national parliaments in EU policy-making and the importance of EU issues to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee to specific questions about parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. 
A principle was followed that the questions should be clear, open and non-leading. The 
questions about parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP concentrated on finding out the 
motivational factors and getting an overview of the legal powers, abilities and factors that 
motivate MPs to scrutinize CFSP or hinder it. Emphasis is on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee meetings when a mandate is given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for FAC 
meetings. The last block looks at the perceptions of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
issues raised in the academic debate about parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP and other 
actors that affect the country’s positions on CFSP in addition to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the parliament.   
Disadvantage of semi-structured interviews compared to structured interviews is that it is 
more difficult to analyse the data because there is so much information. Moreover, in-
depth interviews are very time-consuming and it is more difficult to get MPs with busy 
schedules to agree to an interview, find time for it or to establish contact with them. With 
interviews with politicians, there is also a danger that the respondents may distort 
information to be politically correct. Although in-depth interviews are best conducted 
face to face, also phone interviews can be successful (Mahoney, 1997). Four out of 14 
interviews were conducted on the phone because it suited best for the respondents with 
very busy schedules. All of them went smoothly as previous contact was established 
through e-mails. Six interviews took place in Tallinn, four in Strasbourg and four on the 
phone. Request for an interview was sent to all respondents via e-mail with an explanation 
of the objective of the research. Time and place was chosen by the interviewees, so that 
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they would be able to plan enough time for the in-depth interview and do it in a 
comfortable environment for them.  
As minutes of the Foreign Affairs Committees in both parliaments are very laconic, 
meetings take place behind closed doors and the issues of foreign policy are more 
sensitive and secretive than some other policies, then interviews are the only way to get 
some insight into the parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. For example, the length of the 
discussions about the government positions before the FAC meetings is impossible to 
measure as there are different points in the agenda but the minutes do not show how long 
does each point last. The minutes also do not reflect the content of the discussions and if 
there were disagreements. Both Eduskunta and Riigikogu generally support the positions 
of the government, so interviews are the only way to learn about what is going on behind 
closed doors and if there is any difference between Estonia and Finland and what accounts 
for that difference. In addition to interviews, information is obtained from previous 
academic research on parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP, legislation and documents of 
Estonia and Finland on parliamentary scrutiny and relevant EU treaties. Below, I 
introduce how I have measured formal and informal factors, namely by operationalising 
them according to authority, ability and attitude.  
Measuring the level of parliamentary scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
Using the framework developed by Born and Hänggi of authority, ability and attitude it 
will be compared how the Foreign Affairs Committees of Riigikogu and Eduskunta 
engage in the scrutiny of CFSP. As attitude is the most difficult indicator to measure and 
as Born and Hänggi’s framework was developed for comparison of the use of force under 
international auspices and the parliamentary powers in that context, also previous 
literature on CFSP scrutiny will be used to develop indicators of attitude and willingness. 
Authority or the formal powers of the Foreign Affairs Committees of Eduskunta and 
Riigikogu will be compared according to the criteria offered by Born and Hänggi (binding 
mandate ex ante, troop dispatch ex ante, post hoc questioning/inquiry, budget veto over 
individual missions, amend or veto overall foreign policy budget). The more of these 
formal rights a parliament has and the more binding the mandate given, the stronger the 
formal rights to exercise parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. Based on the criteria developed 
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by Born and Hänggi to compare the ability, the Foreign Affairs Committees of the 
Riigikogu and Eduskunta will be compared for their involvement of specialised 
committees in CFSP scrutiny, size of the committee staff, information rights and the 
timing of the information and access to information by members of the opposition. The 
higher the involvement of specialised committees in CFSP scrutiny, the bigger the 
number of committee staff members, the better the information rights and access to 
information by opposition and the earlier the timing of the information, the better the 
conditions for effective CFSP scrutiny. 
In the context of attitude Born and Hänggi emphasise the importance of the perception of 
parliament about its role in relation to the government and the political salience of security 
issues. As the literature agrees that the power to give a mandate is the strongest tool that 
a parliament can have to scrutinise the government, the attitude of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs towards the Foreign Affairs Committee when he comes to get a mandate from the 
parliament and the attitude of the Foreign Affairs Committee towards the Minister will 
be looked at. This should show how aware MPs are of their scrutiny power and how do 
they see their relationship in relation to the executive. It should also demonstrate if the 
MPs feel that the Minister takes them as scrutinisers and having the power to impact the 
position of the government or not. The interviewees will also be asked if it ever happens 
that the Minister is replaced by a civil servant in presenting the positions of the 
government to the Foreign Affairs Committee before the FAC meetings and if it bothers 
the Committee if the Minister does not come himself. It is the Minister who presents the 
positions of the government in the FAC meetings and who needs a mandate of the 
parliament for that. If the Minister does not take this obligation of appearing in front of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee before FAC meetings seriously it shows that the Minister 
does not see the role of the parliament as a scrutiniser but as automatically approving the 
positions of the government. The more the MPs see themselves and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs sees the Foreign Affairs Committee as a scrutiniser, the higher the 
probability of engaging in CFSP scrutiny. 
Political salience of CFSP issues and attitude towards EU affairs in general will be 
measured by asking MPs how do they perceive the importance of EU issues for their 
parliament and more specifically for the Foreign Affairs Committee and then about the 
importance of CFSP issues for the Foreign Affairs Committee compared to other foreign 
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policy issues. The higher the importance of EU and CFSP issues for parliamentarians, the 
higher should be their attitude towards engaging in the scrutiny of this policy. Another 
aspect of this is how the MPs see the role of national parliaments overall in EU scrutiny 
and the assumption is that the more important the role of national parliaments is 
perceived, the higher should be their attitude towards engaging in CFSP scrutiny as 
parliamentarians feel that they can have an impact. 
This research will go deeper into looking behind the factors that determine the willingness 
of parliamentarians to engage in CFSP scrutiny. Born and Hänggi see as a limiting factor 
of the willingness to engage in the parliamentary scrutiny of foreign affairs their low 
importance for the public compared to domestic issues. So, an indicator of this is the 
interest of the electorate in CFSP issues, which will be measured by how the Members of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee as experts on these issues sense the importance of these 
issues for their country’s population and their electorate compared to domestic issues 
from meetings with the public. The assumption is that the higher the interest of the 
electorate, the higher the willingness to scrutinise CFSP. In the context of CFSP the latest 
Eurobarometer data will be used to compare the support for a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in Finland and in Estonia. The higher the support for CFSP, the less 
Eurosceptic the public is assumed to be and the less willing the parliament should be to 
scrutinise CFSP. As research about parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP has raised the 
problem of democratic deficit, the interviewees were also asked about if they feel that this 
policy field lacks democratic accountability, which should indicate the sense of alienation 
by the public from the EU policy. The assumption is that if the national parliament feels 
that there is democratic deficit and CFSP lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability, 
then they should be more motivated to use the formal powers they have to scrutinise the 
positions of the government to reduce this democratic gap as representatives of the 
electorate. 
As the literature agrees that it is very difficult to measure parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
due to its closed nature and this is why there is so little academic research on it compared 
to scrutiny of other EU policies. This research will also attempt to give new insight into 
how actively Riigikogu and Eduskunta engage in CFSP scrutiny. One indicator to 
measure the level of scrutiny would be to look at how long do the agenda points on CFSP 
issues last on average. However, this is impossible to measure as by looking as the public 
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agendas and minutes do not show how long does each agenda point last. Instead Members 
of the Foreign Affairs Committees of both countries were asked how long do the Foreign 
Affairs Committee Meetings last on average when the Minister of Foreign Affairs comes 
in front of the Committee to present government positions before FAC meetings to get 
comparable data. Duration of the Committee meetings before FAC where the Minister 
presents the government’s positions was taken to indicate how actively the Committee 
discusses the positions. Longer duration suggests more in-depth scrutiny process. The 
MPs were also asked about the intensity of discussion and disagreements among the 
Foreign Affairs Committee members about the positions of the government before FAC 
meetings to get insight into if there is a difference in how actively Riigikogu and 
Eduskunta engage in scrutinising the positions of the government on CFSP in practice. In 
this way, by relying on interviews and insights from practitioners, the level of scrutiny in 
practice will be possible to establish.   
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CASE COMPARISON: ESTONIA AND FINLAND 
Level of overall scrutiny of European Union policies 
When the effectiveness of parliamentary EU scrutiny mechanisms has been measured, 
Finland is ranked without exception as one of the strongest parliaments in the European 
Union and is considered to have one of the strongest level of CFSP involvement (Huff, 
2015; Raunio, 2016b, p. 4) According to the country report on Estonia of the OPAL 
research, Riigikogu has extensive formal scrutiny powers, but this does not translate into 
rigorous scrutiny and its role does not amount to that of a policy shaper or of a government 
watchdog (Ehin, 2015, p. 525). Finnish Eduskunta was found to be a government 
watchdog and policy shaper using the ideal-type framework worked out by Rozenberg 
and Heftler (Neuhold et al., 2016, p. 678). According to this framework of analysis, 
government watchdogs control the actions of the government and hold them accountable 
and policy shapers influence government positions. This also means that either of them 
is considered to be an expert, public forum or European player parliament (Neuhold et 
al., 2016, p. 678). In the case of Finland, the research showed that it could also be a 
European player but chooses not to interact with the European Parliament or engage 
actively in interparliamentary cooperation (Neuhold et al., 2016, p. 681).  
In the OPAL score of institutional strength in EU affairs in general Finland ranks first 
(0.84) and Estonia sixth (0.67) out of 27 EU member states (Figure 1). It takes into 
account three indicators: access to information, scrutiny infrastructure and oversight. 
They looked at the documents that the parliaments have access to and their timing and 
filtering, the number of EACs and their rights, the involvement of specialist standing 
committees, legal ability to bind the government, the ability to scrutinise and draft a 
statement on EU documents or government position and existence of scrutiny reserve 
(Auel, Tacea, et al., 2015, pp. 67–69). However, on the OPAL activity score that measures 
parliamentary activities in EU affairs Finland ranks first again with a score of (0.60) that 
is two times higher than Estonian score (0.30). Activity score was measured by looking 
at the number of mandates/resolutions, EAC meetings and their average duration, debates, 
reasoned opinions, Political Dialogue opinions, hearings and percentage of average 
plenary time spent on EU issues over three years (2010-2012) (Auel, Tacea, et al., 2015, 
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p. 71). This shows that in the overall scrutiny of EU affairs Eduskunta is institutionally 
slightly stronger and twice as active as Riigikogu.  
Figure 1 
OPAL score of formal institutional strength in EU affairs   
 
Source: Auel, K., Rozenberg, O. & Tacea, A. (2015). To Scrutinise or Not to scrutinise? 
Explaining Variation in EU-Related Activities in National Parliaments, West European 
Politics, 38(2), p. 293.  
Authority: the formal powers to hold the government accountable 
Before Estonia joined the European Union, Riigikogu was looking for the best model of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs and took the Finnish model of mandating 
system and strong parliamentary control as an example. In Finland, a new Constitution 
was adopted in 2000 that increased the powers of the parliament. Although Finland has a 
semi-presidential system where the President has special powers in foreign affairs, the 
Prime Minister, who is differently from the President accountable to the parliament, 
represents the country in the European Council (Raunio & Wiberg, 2008). As Table 1 
demonstrates Riigikogu and Eduskunta have the same formal powers in the parliamentary 
scrutiny of CFSP and CSDP when comparing the criteria offered by Born and Hänggi for 
authority. They both have the power of a binding mandate, troop dispatch veto, post hoc 
questioning/inquiry and ability to amend or veto overall foreign policy budget. They both 
do not have the power of budget veto over individual missions. In the context of CFSP 
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the most powerful instrument that a parliament can have is the right to give a mandate for 
the government before the FAC meetings and scrutinise the positions of the government. 
This means that Riigikogu and Eduskunta both have strong formal scrutiny powers of 
CFSP.  
Table 1 
Formal powers over CFSP and CSDP 
Power Estonia Finland 
Binding mandating (ex ante) ✓ ✓ 
Troop dispatch veto (ex ante) ✓ ✓ 
Post hoc questioning/inquiry ✓ ✓ 
Budget veto over individual missions –– –– 
Ability to amend or veto overall foreign 
policy budget 
✓ ✓ 
 
Source: Mölling, C. & von Voss, A. (2015). The Role of EU National Parliaments in 
Defence Affairs. A Comparison of Decision-Making Powers across Europe concerning 
International Troop Deployments and Procurement Processes, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/mlg_vos_WPParliamentaryAppro
val_March2015_01.pdf 
The formal powers of Riigikogu in CFSP are laid down in the Riigikogu Rules of 
Procedure and Internal Rules Act chapter 181 on Rules for proceedings regarding 
European Union matters § 1524 on Proceedings regarding the draft legislation in the 
European Union Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee:  
“(2) Acting in the name of the Riigikogu, the European Union Affairs Committee 
or the Foreign Affairs Committee takes a position regarding the draft legislation 
and states the position in the minutes of the sitting of the committee.  
(3) The Government of the Republic is obligated to adhere to the opinion of the 
Riigikogu. If the Government of the Republic has failed to do so, it must at the 
earliest opportunity explain its reasons to the European Union Affairs Committee 
or the Foreign Affairs Committee.” 2 
                                                
2 Riigikogu. Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act – Riigi Teataja (2007). Chapter 181, § 
1524, section 2,3. Retrieved from https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/518112014003/consolide 
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Differently from the Finnish model, Estonia chose not to fix the competences of the 
parliament in the European affairs in the Constitution. Chapter 8 of the Finnish 
Constitution on International relations sates that “The Government is responsible for the 
national preparation of the decisions to be made in the European Union, and decides on 
the concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of the 
Parliament. The Parliament participates in the national preparation of decisions to be 
made in the European Union” (Ministry of Justice, Finland, 1999). The literature also 
agrees that the ability to issue mandates to ministers before Council meetings is the 
strongest parliamentary scrutiny tool to influence government decision-making in CFSP 
(Huff, 2015, p. 401).  
In the interviews, also all of the Estonian and Finnish parliamentarians said that the 
current formal powers are enough to exercise parliamentary scrutiny effectively. One 
Estonian interviewee said “Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have all the levers, 
it is up to them to use them”. Another said that “Estonian parliament could actually use 
their formal powers more in practice”. A Finnish MP said that “Members of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee have all the necessary formal powers for controlling the government 
in CFSP, it is up to them how efficiently they use them.” The mandate of the Foreign 
Affairs Committees of Riigikogu and Eduskunta is politically binding for the 
governments. MPs were also asked about how would the Foreign Affairs Committee react 
when the Minister of Foreign Affairs would deviate from the mandate given to him in 
discussing CFSP and would there be any consequences. MPs from both countries said 
that they cannot recall that this has ever happened but there would be very serious 
consequences. The Minister would have to appear in front of the Committee and explain 
his actions and this could lead to a vote of confidence against the Minister. In both 
countries, it has happened that when during the negotiations in the FAC meeting the 
Minister has had to change the country’s position confirmed by the parliament, the 
Minister has phoned the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee to get an approval 
for the new position. In the case of both countries this has actually not been regulated 
anywhere, but as one Estonian interviewee put it “It is a question of political culture and 
traditions, it is not possible to regulate everything, but it is also in the interest of the 
Minister to always have the backing of the parliament for his decisions”. One Finnish 
interviewee said that “As in parliamentary culture a lot is down to traditions that are not 
  37 
regulated, but if the Minister would break this trust, then there would be serious 
consequences”. The interviews showed that Riigikogu and Eduskunta have similar formal 
scrutiny powers of CFSP.  
Ability: Resources, staff and expertise needed 
According to the framework of analysis of Born and Hänggi on ability, the involvement 
of specialised parliamentary committees in CFSP scrutiny is the most important factor in 
determining the effectiveness of scrutiny. One of the reasons why Estonia opted for the 
Finnish model of parliamentary scrutiny instead of the Danish one, was the involvement 
of specialised committees in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies. Both parliaments 
have a special committee for EU affairs (European Union Affairs Committee in the 
Riigikogu and Grand Committee in Eduskunta), but the Foreign Affairs Committees are 
responsible for the scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Table 2, 
regulated by Section 96 of the Finnish Constitution and Chapter 4, paragraph 18, Section 
3 of the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act). The use of specialised 
committees in EU-policy parliamentary scrutiny means that the CFSP scrutiny benefits 
from the foreign policy expertise of the Foreign Affairs Committee and it increases the 
ability of the parliament to influence the government. 
Table 2 
Role of Foreign Affairs Committee in CFSP scrutiny 
 Estonia Finland 
Level of Foreign Affairs Committee involvement in CFSP 
scrutiny 
High High 
 
High level involvement of the Foreign Affairs Committee means that these committees 
have full responsibility in scrutinising CFSP. According to the comments of the Riigikogu 
Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act’s paragraph about the processing of European 
Union affairs “The Foreign Affairs Committee has an analogical competence with the 
European Union Affairs Committee only in the field of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union. In other questions the Foreign Affairs Committee 
participates in the formation of the position of the Riigikogu like other permanent 
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committees” (Mõttus et al., 2012, Chapter 181, Section 5). The position of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee is mandatory for the government in CFSP and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs needs to stick to it. Section 96 of Chapter 8 on international relations of the Finnish 
Constitution states that: 
 “The Parliament considers those proposals for acts, agreements and other measures 
which are to be decided in the European Union and which otherwise, according to 
the Constitution, would fall within the competence of the Parliament. The 
Government shall, for the determination of the position of the Parliament, 
communicate a proposal referred to in paragraph (1) to the Parliament by a 
communication of the Government, without delay, after receiving notice of the 
proposal. The proposal is considered in the Grand Committee and ordinarily in one 
or more of the other Committees that issue statements to the Grand Committee. 
However, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers a proposal pertaining to foreign 
and security policy.” 3  
The Foreign Affairs Committees of both Riigikogu and Eduskunta have exclusive rights 
in CFSP scrutiny and give a mandate for the Minister of Foreign Affairs before Foreign 
Affairs Council Meetings and decide the stance of the parliament on this policy. Other 
research also shows that the use of specialised committees in the parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU policies leads to stronger government scrutiny, especially committees with 
jurisdiction paralleling responsible executive departments (Strom & Mattson, 1995, pp. 
249–307). 
Another important measure of ability is also the resources and expertise available to the 
Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. According to Born and Hänggi one indicator 
is the number of staff members. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu 
currently has 10 members and 3 staff members (2 advisers and one assistant). The Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta has 16 members and 5 staff members (2 advisers, 2 
assistants and 1 technical assistant shared with the Defence Committee). This means that 
both Committees have the same ratio of staff per Committee member (0,3). Although 
Finnish parliamentarians also have the possibility to have a personal assistant or can share 
one with another MP and Estonian parliament is one of the six parliaments in the EU 
where parliamentarians do not have a personal assistant, but are assisted by the staff of 
their political factions at the Riigikogu in their parliamentary work and can also rely on 
                                                
3 Ministry of Justice, Finland. The Constitution of Finland (1999). Chapter 8, Section 96. Retrieved from 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf 
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the Riigikogu Legal and Research Department (Riigikogu Kantselei õigus- ja 
analüüsiosakond, 2017). This means that the Riigikogu and Eduskunta have similar 
opportunities when it comes to staff and expertise available for them to scrutinise CFSP.  
Although the Finnish and the Estonian Foreign Affairs Committees both have a small 
secretariat and the same number of staff members per Committee member, there were 
some MPs from both countries who said that the small number of staff members/ 
resources is a factor that hinders them in their work as scrutinisers of CFSP. A majority 
from both parliaments said that all the formal powers, capabilities and resources are 
enough and it is just up to the will of the MPs to use these powers. One Estonian member 
said that “It is the own responsibility of the MPs how informed they want to be on CFSP 
issues and how active they want to be in scrutinising it, all the necessary conditions are 
created.” One Finnish MP said that “The Finnish system works very well and we have 
quite good resources. It depends on the initiative and interest of the MPs to use these 
resources available.” 
According to Born and Hänggi another very important indicator of ability is access to 
information. Finland, has it even written to the Constitution that the parliament has the 
right to receive any information from the government that is necessary for parliamentary 
scrutiny and a matter within the competence of the Committee. Section 47 on of Chapter 
4 on parliamentary activity states that: 
“The Parliament has the right to receive from the Government the information it 
needs in the consideration of matters. The appropriate Minister shall ensure that 
Committees and other parliamentary organs receive without delay the necessary 
documents and other information in the possession of the authorities. A Committee 
has the right to receive information from the Government or the appropriate 
Ministry on a matter within its competence. The Committee may issue a statement 
to the Government or the Ministry on the basis of the information.”4 
The parliamentary rights to receive information on international affairs are separately 
regulated in Section 96 of Chapter 8 that states that “The Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Parliament shall receive from the Government, upon request and when otherwise 
necessary, reports of matters pertaining to foreign and security policy” (Ministry of 
                                                
4 Ministry of Justice, Finland. The Constitution of Finland (1999). Chapter 4, Section 47. Retrieved from 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf 
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Justice, Finland, 1999). According to Chapter 4, Paragraph 22, Section 1 of the Riigikogu 
Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act all the Committees of the Riigikogu have the 
right to request any information from the government needed for its work and to request 
the participation of ministers or representatives of government agencies in the Committee 
meetings to obtain information (Riigikogu, 2007). The Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Riigikogu also has the right to demand from the government to give an opinion of the 
committee on important EU issues that they do not given an opinion on automatically 
(Riigikogu, 2007, Chapter 181, paragraph 1521, Section 2). The literature agrees that 
information is of key importance for the parliament to exercise scrutiny (O’Brennan, 
2007, p. 12). Both Foreign Affairs Committees have very good information rights. 
Although differently from Estonia, access to information of Eduskunta is written in the 
Constitution, it came out from the interviews that Estonian MPs feel that at times they 
have access to more and better information that their Nordic colleagues. “In cooperation 
with Nordic colleagues, including Finnish colleagues, I have felt that Estonians are 
actually better informed because we have regular briefings with our national security 
organisations” and “Although Estonians have a weaker legal basis for their information 
access, in practice we get the same information, but Estonians just do not use it.” They 
feel that they can request any information from the government and also have access to 
EU secrets and can also request access to NATO secrets if they agree to go through the 
background check. Interestingly two Finnish MPs also mentioned the importance of 
strong links with their political party groups in the European Parliament where they get 
additional important information for parliamentary scrutiny. None of the Estonian MPs 
mentioned cooperation with the European Parliament. Overall Finnish MPs talked more 
than Estonian MPSs about the importance of the cooperation with other national 
parliaments on sharing information and working together to strengthen the position.  
Important is also the timing of the information and access to information by the members 
of the opposition. The parliamentary control systems of both Riigikogu and Eduskunta 
emphasise ex ante scrutiny. Parliamentarians from both countries mentioned that the 
information is received from the government automatically, but in the case of the 
positions of the government at the FAC meetings just a few days before the Committee 
meeting, which gives little time for effective scrutiny. The Minister comes to the 
Committee usually a week before the FAC meetings and the Committee members receive 
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in advance the positions of the government on the topics on the agenda. Estonian and 
Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee have the same system and the timing of the 
information is the same that concentrates on ex ante scrutiny. In general parliamentarians 
from both countries also said that there is no difference between access to information by 
the members of the coalition and opposition in CFSP scrutiny. Some Estonian members 
admitted that sometimes it might be easier for parliamentarians of the coalition to have 
direct contact with the Minister and get additional information. Many Estonian members 
emphasised that it actually depends on the activeness, will and motivation of the 
parliamentarians to request certain information that they do not have automatic access to. 
MPs from both countries also mentioned the problem of information overload and the too 
technical context of EU documents.  
When asked about if there is a difference in the scrutiny ability of members of the 
opposition and members of the coalition, then all the Finnish MPs responded very 
confidently that there is absolutely no difference as everyone has the same information 
rights and the atmosphere in the Committee is very collegial. Most of the Estonian 
parliamentarians also said that there is no difference. Holzhacker has focused in his 
research on the powers of the opposition in the EU policy scrutiny as an important factor 
affecting democratic legitimacy of the policy. He argues that national parliamentary 
scrutiny is of crucial value as it is the only way the voice of the opposition can be heard 
in the scrutiny of EU policies and the only way they can participate in the policy-making 
as in the Council of Ministers representatives of the government participate and make the 
decisions (Holzhacker, 2008, p. 144).  
Regarding information rights, information asymmetry between the minister and 
parliament is especially a problem in CFSP due to the sensitive information and closed 
nature of the policy area and governments are better informed. When asked about the 
existence of information asymmetry all the Finnish members said that they are satisfied 
with the current scrutiny system and access to information and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs is very open and honest about CFSP issues. “Opportunities to get information are 
enormously wide, we just have to have initiative,” “There is a good dialogue with the 
Minister and it is evident that Minister wants to give the parliamentarians as much 
information as possible,” and “We have unrestricted access to all the necessary 
information. One Finnish MP even admitted that sometimes the parliamentarians are even 
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better informed if they are well connected on the European party systems and active, then 
they have all the possibilities for effective scrutiny.” Estonian MPs also felt that they have 
access to all the information necessary for effective parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP and 
it is up to the parliamentarians to actively request that information. “If I request 
something, I get it,” “We are also in the information flow of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and members can get daily information about Estonia in the foreign media” and 
“Access to information depends also on the fact if MPs are interested in asking for 
information and also on their contacts.” The comparison of information rights and the 
interview results showed that parliamentarians from both countries do not feel that there 
is an information asymmetry and they can have access to any information that they want. 
According to the criteria offered by Born and Hänggi the Foreign Affairs Committees of 
Riigikogu and Eduskunta also have similar ability to scrutinise CFSP.  
Attitude: the willingness to hold the government accountable 
Attitude was assessed as role perception and awareness of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
as scrutinisers and the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs towards the 
parliamentary Committee and the Committee towards the Minister to understand the 
perception of parliament about its role in relation to the government and vice versa. 
Finnish Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee all stressed the fact that the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs has a lot of respect towards the Foreign Affairs Committee. One 
interviewee even said that the Minister comes in front of the Committee to get valuable 
expert advice from the parliamentarians and new perspectives to the positions of the 
government at FAC meetings. Another said that “there is expertise in the Committee that 
the Minister respects and uses the knowledge in negotiations in FAC meetings.” This 
respectful attitude towards the Foreign Affairs Committee is also reflected in the fact that 
Pekka Haavisto who is a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee is also Foreign 
Minister Timo Soini’s Special Representative on mediation with special focus on Africa.  
One MP said “The Minister is aware that he must always have the confidence of the 
parliament and that the parliament is the boss.” About the awareness of the role as 
scrutinisers of the Committee members, interviewees emphasised the constructive 
atmosphere, but said that this does not prevent active scrutiny of government positions 
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and MPs come with the questions prepared and are aware that they are the ones who give 
a mandate for the Minister.  
Estonian interviewees were more divided on the opinion of the process of giving a 
mandate and some described it as a mere formality because the Minister knows that the 
parliament will agree with the positions anyway and others said that the Committee is 
aware of its role as a scrutiniser, but only gets involved when the positions of the 
government on CFSP are not in line with Estonian foreign policy. An example of this was 
when the Committee recently toughened the positions of the government about the 
conflict in Ukraine for the FAC meeting of 6th of February 2017 (Riigikogu Press Service, 
2017). A few Estonian MPs even described it as “an annoying obligation” for the Minister 
to appear in front of the Committee “as the mandate is basically automatic anyway”. 
Another MP described it as a “pure formality for the Minister to appear in front of the 
Committee” and one even said that sometimes it is felt that the attitude of the Minister 
towards the Committee is degrading. One Estonian MP saw it as an educating function 
for the Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee when the Minister comes in front of 
the Committee, as many members do not have any expertise in foreign affairs. One 
Estonian MP admitted that the attitude of the Minister towards the Committee is also 
down to political culture as it is up to the Minister to decide how he will communicate 
with the parliament and how informed he will keep them, because in the parliamentary 
culture traditions play an important role and everything is now written down. About the 
awareness of their role as a scrutiniser of government positions on CFSP one MP 
answered “an average Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu has no 
idea what is on the agenda before coming to the meeting and the level of preparation is 
low and is definitely not aware of his or her role as giving a mandate for the Minister.” In 
the Estonian case, it also came out very clearly that MPs who had been in the parliament 
and in the Foreign Affairs Committee longer, were also more aware of their role as 
scrutinisers and especially emphasised the parliament’s role as a government watchdog.  
The Finnish interviewees pointed out that in Finland, it is always the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who comes to present the positions of the government at the FAC meetings and 
there have been very rare cases when the Minister is replaced by a civil servant of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and there has to be a justified reason for the absence. 
Therefore, according to the interviewees, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta 
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also does not look negatively when the positions are not presented by the Minister as there 
is usually a serious reason like an illness. One Finnish MP said that if the Minister would 
not come in front of the Committee and there would not be a serious or meaningful reason 
for it “there would be a very strong reaction from the Committee.” However, according 
to the interviews it happens more often in the Riigikogu and the Committee takes it “very 
negatively” as it is the Minister who should get a mandate from the parliament and who 
later presents these positions in Brussels. According to the interviews the Committee 
takes it negatively as it also shows the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs towards 
the Committee as a mere sealer of the positions of the government not as an active 
scrutiniser. There have even been cases when the Chairman of the Committee has had to 
write a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to remind him of the obligation and it 
should be a priority that the Minister himself could come. This suggests that the Minister 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia takes this obligation to appear in front of 
the Committee more lightly than the Finnish counterpart. At the same time, many 
Estonian MPs brought it out that although it does happen sometimes that the Minister is 
replaced by a civil servant without a meaningful reason it definitely happens more often 
in the European Affairs Committee than in the Foreign Affairs Committee.  
Interviews demonstrated that Finnish politicians are more aware of their role as 
scrutinisers than Estonian MPs and the broader context of the perception of parliament 
about its role in relation to the government is also different. It also showed that the Finnish 
MPs are better prepared before the Committee meetings where government positions at 
the FAC meetings are discussed and the Minister comes to get expert advice and a 
mandate from the Foreign Affairs Committee. Estonian MPs are less aware of their role 
as scrutinisers and approve the positions of the government without much discussion. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland also seems to take the obligation of appearing 
himself before the Committee to get a mandate more seriously than in Estonia and has 
the attitude towards the Committee as scrutinisers, which is less the case in Estonia. This 
indicates that as the Finnish MPs see themselves more as scrutinisers and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs sees the Foreign Affairs Committee more as a scrutiniser, then the Finnish 
Foreign Affairs Committee is more likely to engage in CFSP scrutiny than the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu.   
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Also looked at in the context of attitude of parliamentarians towards CFSP scrutiny was 
the perception of the importance of EU issues in general for the parliamentarians and then 
specifically CFSP issues for the Foreign Affairs Committee compared to other foreign 
policy issues and how parliamentarians see overall the role of national parliaments in EU 
policy-making. Finnish interviewees all emphasised the high importance of EU issues for 
Eduskunta and the Foreign Affairs Committee as the policy outcomes “have a huge 
influence on Finland”. Finnish MPs also stressed that Finland is active in the development 
of EU crisis management, which is often discussed in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The Finnish MPs saw their role as being influential in the shaping and formation of the 
CFSP and are satisfied with the Finnish scrutiny system and the Committee’s 
parliamentary scrutiny. One respondent said that “The Finnish parliament can most 
definitely shape and impact the outcome of CFSP” and another said that “CFSP issues 
are extremely important for the Foreign Affairs Committee and MPs are making the most 
of their formal powers to scrutinise it.” Many interviewees also mentioned that joining 
the European Union actually strengthened the role of Eduskunta and its control over 
government actions, because in national foreign policy there is no mandating.  
Estonian MPs were more divided on the importance of EU issues and CFSP issues for the 
Riigikogu and the Foreign Affairs Committee and the perception of the role of national 
parliaments in EU policy-making. One said that “EU matters should be important for 
Members of the Riigikogu and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee but they are 
not.” Another said that “CFSP issues are more and more important for the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, because of global turbulent times.” One Estonian MP also admitted that for 
him CFSP is not a coherent and strong policy and this is why it is also not important for 
him. Most of the Estonian MPs see the role of national parliaments as not very influential 
and important in EU policy-making and especially of small countries like Estonia. 
“Riigikogu has no role, it is just a formality that it approves the positions of the 
government and there is no discussion of substance over the positions at the Foreign 
Affairs Committee.” One MP also said that “Only the parliaments of big member states 
can influence the outcome of CFSP and we are just followers, but the role of national 
parliaments should actually be bigger.” Yet another one admitted that the role of national 
parliaments in EU policy-making is as important as the MPs consider it and it is also up 
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to the parliamentarians if the parliament plays a role of policy-shaper or just a controller 
of the government or no role at all.  
Interviews showed that Finnish MPs emphasised more the importance of EU affairs and 
CFSP issues for Eduskunta and the Foreign Affairs Committee and Estonian MPs were 
more divided on this. Members of Eduskunta also saw the role of national parliaments 
more influential than the Estonian MPs and saw that they have the power to shape and 
impact the CFSP, whereas Estonian respondents were more pessimistic about their ability 
to influence the outcome of CFSP. Results indicate that as the importance of EU and 
CFSP issues is higher for Finnish MPs, then the higher should be their attitude towards 
engaging in the scrutiny of CFSP as they value it. Moreover, as the Finnish MPs perceive 
the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making as more important than the 
Estonian MPs perceived it, their attitude towards CFSP scrutiny should be higher as they 
feel more that they can have an impact and influence the outcome of CFSP. 
While looking behind the factors that determine the willingness of parliamentarians to 
engage in CFSP scrutiny the interest of the Finnish and Estonian public in the meaning 
of the electorate in CFSP issues was also researched. MPs from both countries admitted 
that although as Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee they are the most informed 
on these issues, when they have meetings with their electorate their worries and questions 
are in majority about domestic issues that influence more directly their everyday life.  
However, members of both parliaments said that the importance of CFSP issues and 
people’s awareness of these issues has grown in the last years due to turbulent times in 
European and world politics and people are more and more directly influenced by them. 
As the interest of the Estonian and Finnish population in CFSP is low in general, it can 
also lower the willingness of MPs to scrutinise CFSP as it is not a policy that seems 
important for their electorate compared to domestic issues. According to Raunio though 
the changes in the international system, higher levels of education and a higher variety of 
sources of information, should contribute to the rise of public interest and debate about 
foreign policy and should create strong incentives for parliamentary engagement in CFSP 
and the interviewees from both countries admitted that the interest is growing (Raunio, 
2016a, p. 313).  
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Previous research on parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs has shown that the higher the 
presence of Eurosceptic public, the stronger the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs, as 
the MPs as representatives of the electorate have a stronger incentive to control the actions 
of the government. This will be applied to Estonia and Finland in the context of support 
for the statement a common foreign policy of all member states of the EU by using the 
latest Eurobarometer results. The data (Table 3) suggests that the Finnish population is 
more anti-CSFP and sceptical about the policy than the Estonian population and thus the 
Finnish MPs should be more willing to scrutinise CFSP to control the actions of the 
government and represent the interests of their electorate.  
Table 3 
Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy in Estonia and Finland, 2016 
Country For (%) Against (%) Don’t know (%) 
Estonia 66 22 12 
Finland 57 38 5 
 
Source: European Commission. Public opinion, November 2016: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/
29/groupKy/184 
 
The last indicator of willingness to scrutinise CFSP is the perception of MPs about the 
existence of democratic deficit in CFSP. In the academic literature, there is a lot of talk 
about the democratic deficit in CFSP as it is a policy field with less parliamentary control 
mechanisms than other EU policy fields and also supranational institutions like the 
European Commission and the EEAS play a central role. The willingness of MPs to 
scrutinise CFSP also has a direct impact on the democratic legitimacy of this policy. 
When asked about the existence of democratic deficit in CFSP, a majority of Finnish MPs 
answered that at least in the Finnish system there is no democratic deficit because the 
parliament has scrutinised all the government decisions in CFSP. One MP said that “It 
might be the case in other EU countries, but there is definitely no democratic deficit in 
the Finnish system as the parliament is involved at every step and decision.” Estonian 
MPs were more certain about lack of democracy in CFSP formation, but many mentioned 
that the situation is improving as the EU policy-making has become more open and 
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transparent. One MP also said that “The parliament has all the possibilities to participate 
in the EU level to solve that problem.” The results show that Estonian MPs feel more than 
Finnish MPs that there is democratic deficit and CFSP lacks democratic legitimacy and 
accountability and they should be more motivated to use the formal powers they have to 
scrutinise the positions of the government to reduce this democratic gap as representatives 
of the electorate. Overall the results show that at least parliamentarians with strong formal 
scrutiny powers feel less the democratic deficit than the academic literature emphasises. 
Interviews showed that there is a difference in the attitude and willingness of the Members 
of the Foreign Affairs Committees of Riigikogu and Eduskunta and how they see their 
role as scrutinisers. The Finnish MPs are more aware of their role as scrutinisers of 
government activities and the Minister of Foreign Affairs also treats them more as 
scrutinisers. All of the Finnish interviewees also expressed their satisfaction with the 
current scrutiny system that gives Eduskunta strong powers and valued more the 
importance of EU affairs for their parliament and CFSP issues for their Committee than 
their Estonian colleagues. Finnish MPs also believe more in the power of national 
parliaments to shape and impact the CFSP than Estonian MPs. Both Finnish and Estonian 
MPs stated that the importance of CFSP topics for their electorate is relatively low but 
growing, which means that actively participating in the scrutiny of this policy might have 
no impact on re-election chances but this might increase as the importance of this policy 
for the electorate increases. Finnish MPs should be also willing to scrutinise CFSP more, 
because of the lower support of the Finnish population for this policy compared to 
Estonia, which should motivate parliamentarians to tighten more the control over the 
actions of the government in this policy field as anti-CFSP sentiment is stronger among 
their electorate. However, as Estonian MPs perceived more the existence of a democratic 
deficit in the policy-making of CFSP, this should increase their willingness to engage in 
CFSP scrutiny to decrease this lack of democracy and so that their electorate would be 
better represented at the European level. Overall the results indicate that Finnish Members 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee should be more willing to scrutinise CFSP than 
Estonian members and they show more attitude and role persecution of a scrutiniser.  
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Level of parliamentary scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Researchers have agreed that the power to give a mandate is the strongest tool that a 
parliament can have to scrutinise CFSP. Research on parliamentary scrutiny has also 
concluded that the actual impact of parliamentary influence is extremely difficult to 
measure and therefore it is only possible to capture what parliaments do and how actively 
they engage in scrutiny (Auel, Rozenberg, et al., 2015, p. 284). Yet as the Foreign Affairs 
Committee meetings are closed and the minutes only reflect the decisions, it is very 
difficult to measure the level of actual CFSP scrutiny over the government positions 
before FAC meetings. The decisions are usually the same — to support the positions of 
the government, because the Minister cannot go the Council meeting without the mandate 
of the parliament but they do not reflect the content of the discussions and activeness of 
the Committee to scrutinise. There is a difference if a mandate is given automatically 
without a long discussion about the positions of the government or after an active 
discussion and even disagreements where consensus is reached. It is also not known how 
long do these discussions last because the minutes only reflect the beginning and end time 
of the meeting not how long each point on the agenda lasts. The level of CFSP scrutiny 
will be measured based on the data from the interviews about how long do the meetings 
last on average where a mandate is given for the Minister before FAC meetings and how 
the discussions and scrutiny of these meetings is described by members of the Committee 
and longtime staff members.  
According to the interviews in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta there is 
always active discussion about the positions of the government before the FAC meetings 
that last on average 1-2 hours. One MP said that “The Minister usually does not have a 
time limit, when he comes in front of the Committee and stays there as long as the 
members want.” The Finnish MPs described the discussions before FAC meetings as 
“active scrutiny”, “intense debate” “everyone always asks many questions” and 
“intellectual discussion.” It was also mentioned that there are often disagreements, but 
consensus is always found. Based on the interviews the Foreign Affairs Committee 
meetings of the Riigikogu before the FAC meetings in Brussels last on average 20-45 
minutes depending on the issues on the FAC agenda and there is little discussion about 
the positions of the government. The Estonian MPs described giving the mandate as a 
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hearing or an informative point on the agenda with little discussion over the positions of 
the government and only some questions to the Minister. Estonians described it as 
“listening to the talking points,” “there is no debate of substance,” “questions of MPs are 
superficial” and “preparation by the members for the meeting is low and there are not 
many questions.” The results indicate that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Eduskunta engages more actively in CFSP scrutiny than the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the Riigikogu.  
Many Members of the Riigikogu felt themselves that the Foreign Affairs Committee is 
not very active in scrutinising CFSP as there is too little expertise on foreign policy in the 
Committee as there are many members who have no previous contact with foreign policy 
issues although there are also members who are previous Ministers. “The quality of 
members is low,” “MPs are too much in their comfort-zone” and “Most of the Committee 
members show only mild interest for the issues on the agenda.” This is in stark contrast 
with the Finnish case as all Eduskunta members emphasised the high level of expertise in 
foreign policy of the Committee members and there are also many former Ministers. 
Interviews show that there is a culture of consensus in both Foreign Affairs Committees. 
It was especially emphasised by the Finnish MPs, but as the results show this does not 
rule out disagreements or active discussion over the government positions before FAC 
meetings. The culture of consensus in foreign policy was emphasised by MPs of both 
countries as a factor that differentiates scrutiny of CFSP from other EU policy areas. It 
was also brought out in the interviews that it is facilitated by the fact that Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs are often former Chairmen or Members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committees and understand the importance of parliament and its role in CFSP scrutiny. 
In fact, the current Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Finland and Estonia are both former 
Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Research showed that the Foreign Affairs Committees of Riigikogu and Eduskunta have 
similar formal powers and capabilities, but there is a difference in the attitude and 
willingness of parliamentarians to scrutinise CFSP, which account for the difference in 
the scrutiny of CFSP in practice. Finnish MPs are more aware of their role as scrutinisers 
and also more willing to scrutinise CFSP than the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Riigikogu and also have a higher level of CFSP scrutiny in practice. Although the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu has same formal powers, they are less willingness to 
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use them to scrutinise CFSP. Previous research on parliamentary scrutiny also supports 
that strong powers of the parliament to control their governments do not always convert 
to active scrutiny due to lack of awareness of those rights (Buzogany, 2010, p. 20). 
Wessels also found in his cross-country study that role-orientations of individual MPs are 
a crucial factor in understanding their engagement in EU affairs (Wessels, 2005, pp. 446–
465).  
Research results are in line with my initial hypotheses that the more parliamentarians 
conceive of their role as giving effect to parliamentary control, the higher levels of 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP affairs and the higher the willingness of parliamentarians 
to exert parliamentary control, the higher levels of scrutiny of CFSP affairs. Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta is more willing to scrutinise CFSP than the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu as they are more aware of their role as scrutinisers 
and also see that national parliaments can have an impact on CFSP and thus also perceive 
that there is no democratic deficit of that policy. This research indicates that Finnish MPs 
are more willing to scrutinise CFSP as support for this policy is lower than in Estonia and 
parliamentarians have more incentive to control the actions of the government and they 
also perceive EU and CFSP issues as more important for their parliament than Estonia. 
Although according to earlier research electorate interest should also determine the level 
of scrutiny, but despite the low interest of the Finnish population, Eduskunta is a strong 
and willing scrutiniser of CFSP. As Estonian MPs perceived more that there is lack of 
democracy in the policy-making of CFSP, they should be more willing to scrutinise it, 
but this research indicates that this factor seems not to affect the willingness to scrutinise.  
Interviewees also pointed out other factors that affect the scrutiny of CFSP. Many 
respondents from both countries stressed that in majority coalition governments there is 
less motivation for parliamentarians of the coalition parties to criticise the minister from 
the coalition, especially as pressurising the government and giving a too fixed mandate, 
could harm the negotiation power of the country and can harm the government’s standing 
abroad. This is also in line with Born and Hänggi who also argue that willingness of 
parliamentarians to scrutinise CFSP is affected by the fact that parliamentarians 
belonging to coalition parties are not motivated to openly criticise the actions of their 
coalition minister and government (Born & Hänggi, 2004, p. 15). The Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu is usually always from the coalition, but from 
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a different political party than the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which gives the coalition 
parliamentarians less motivation to criticise the actions of their coalition minister. 
However, it came out from the interviews that it has happened that the Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee has criticised the coalition Minister and even publicly. In 
Finland, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee can also be from the opposition, 
which also gives more incentive for parliamentarians to scrutinise the government.  
Institutional and political culture and new institutionalist approaches 
Sociological institutionalists emphasise the importance of political and parliamentary 
culture in determining the engagement in parliamentary scrutiny. Even in discussions 
about formal powers and abilities, the interviewees emphasised that these formal powers 
do not determine if MPs engage in parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. Throughout the 
interviews, MPs and staff members mentioned that in parliamentary cultures there are 
many unwritten rules and a lot is based on traditions and political culture, even the 
relationship between the executive and the legislative. The Foreign Affairs Committees 
of Riigikogu and Eduskunta have the strongest formal power to give a mandate but it is 
up to the politicians themselves how actively they engage in using this power to scrutinise 
the government positions on CFSP.  
It came out from the interviews that political and parliamentary culture are very important 
in determining how parliamentarians scrutinise CFSP. MPs from both countries 
especially emphasised the tradition of the culture of consensus in foreign policy above 
party lines as a unique factor in influencing the scrutiny of this policy field. Factors that 
sociological institutionalists emphasise like political culture, role perceptions and the 
strength of European and institutional identity seem to play a crucial part. The culture of 
consensus is guaranteed in Finland through active cooperation with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in different formats and informal meetings and communication is also 
facilitated by the fact that in Finland ministers are also Members of Parliament differently 
from Estonia. It also came out from the interviews that the disagreement division lines 
over the positions of the government at FAC meetings are not usually party-based, but 
normally depend on the topic discussed and also coalition parliamentarians have 
questioned the government-line. This offers evidence to the research of Martin and 
Vanberg of coalition partners using parliamentary committees to keep check on the 
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minister from the coalition party (Martin & Vanberg, 2004). It is also in line with the 
findings of Raunio about the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta that although 
the approach is consensual, there are active discussions “that also see coalition partners 
keeping tabs on each other.” (Raunio, 2016c, p. 3). Finnish MPs said that in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee there is more consensus and cooperation above the party lines 
compared to the Grand Committee that deals with the scrutiny of other EU policies.  
Both in the case of Estonia and Finland the culture of consensus is also facilitated by a 
tradition of majority governments, which encourages ideological convergence between 
parties (Raunio, 2015, p. 417). The mandate system of parliamentary scrutiny itself 
encourages consensus in foreign policy as it is built on close cooperation and consensus 
building between the legislation and government and keeping the differences behind 
closed doors to speak with one voice and have better bargaining power at the EU level 
(Raunio, 2015, p. 420). Raunio also emphasises that the Finnish case demonstrates the 
importance of establishing a culture of parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs. 
Finland is one of the EU parliaments with the strongest level of involvement in CFSP and 
in addition to the formal powers, also important is the systematic approach to 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP  (Raunio, 2016c, pp. 2–3).  
One Estonian MP also emphasised the importance of the personal relationship between 
the Minister and Chairman of the Committee as everything is not formally regulated and 
this adds importance to parliamentary customs and traditions and the political culture. 
Although the culture of consensus in the Committee was mentioned by MPs of both 
countries, the Finnish politicians emphasised it more. Finland has a long tradition of 
consensus in foreign policy with the purpose of maintaining national unity and avoiding 
expressing publicly differences in party lines. Several Finnish MPs also mentioned in this 
context the rise to power of the populist and nationalist Finns Party with the last 
parliamentary elections in 2015, because their rhetoric in the CFSP is different from the 
consensual Finnish foreign policy. The fact that the current Minister of Foreign Affairs is 
also from that party prepared the parliament for tougher scrutiny but the MPs admitted 
that the party has followed the previous consensual line of action in the CFSP. In the 
context of the political culture one Estonian MP brought out the difference between the 
two countries as Finland has a longer history of democracy and it also affects the 
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development of parliamentary culture and how the parliament is perceived by the public, 
civil servants and the ministers.  
Sociological institutionalists explain the best why parliaments engage in the scrutiny of 
CFSP. As it is a policy area where parliamentary scrutiny is less automatic compared to 
other policy areas of EU, informal factors are especially important in determining the 
engagement of parliamentarians in CFSP scrutiny. There is a cooperative culture of 
consensus in foreign policy in both countries and a tradition of majority governments, 
where coalition members are generally less motivated to actively and publicly scrutinise 
the government. This already determines how parliamentarians will engage in CFSP 
scrutiny, but as the research shows this does not prevent active scrutiny and discussion of 
government positions in the Foreign Affairs Committee. This study also demonstrates 
that the general perception of the relationship between the executive and the legislative 
and role perception of the parliamentarians as scrutinisers is important in determining the 
engagement in scrutiny of CFSP in practice. Also crucial is the salience of EU issues in 
general for the parliamentarians and the strength of European identity. Moreover, the 
perception of MPs about the role of national parliaments in EU policy-making is also a 
factor that influences the motivation to scrutinise and the presence of Eurosceptic public. 
The results of this study have shown that the rational choice institutionalism and the 
principal-agent theory that is the most used theory in the context of research on 
parliamentary scrutiny, might not always explain the best parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP 
as a policy area where party politics do not seem to play such an important role as in other 
policies. This research has demonstrated that political bargaining and pursuit of interest 
that rational choice institutionalists emphasise do not determine engagement in 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. Rationalists also stress the importance of formal 
structures in determining the engagement in parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP, but this 
research has shown that although formal powers are important, but informal factors like 
political and institutionalist culture, role perceptions and European and institutionalist 
identity influence also how actively parliamentarians engage in CFSP scrutiny.  
In the debate about Europeanisation, deparliamentarisation and parliamentarisation in the 
European Union policy-making, the results indicate that instead of de-parliamentarisation 
at least in the case of strong scrutinisers like Estonia and Finland, we can talk about 
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parliamentarisation. Longtime Members of the Finnish parliament also emphasised the 
fact that Eduskunta benefitted greatly from joining the European Union and actually 
gained power in that process and after the changes made to the Finnish Constitution, 
which gave the Eduskunta constitutional authority in foreign affairs. Tapio Raunio and 
Matti Wiberg have looked specifically at Eduskunta in the context of the de-
parliamentarisation thesis and they argue that with the new Constitution of 2000 the 
competences of Eduskunta in foreign policy were strengthened and membership of the 
EU further contributed to the parliamentarisation of foreign policy (Raunio & Wiberg, 
2008, p. 587). Estonia also took the direction in the very beginning of creating EU policy 
scrutiny mechanisms that would give Riigikogu strong formal powers. In the case of both 
countries we can also talk about Europeanisation in the meaning that topics related to the 
foreign policy and external relations of the European Union are an integral and important 
part of the work of the Foreign Affairs Committees. Both countries also actively support 
further developments in the CFSP, which also contributes to the Europeanisation. Finland 
is active in the crisis management dimension and Estonia supports a unified foreign policy 
towards Russia and a strong European Neighbourhood Policy (The Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland, 2015), (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).  
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CONCLUSION 
Parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies has been in the research focus after the Lisbon 
Treaty, but the Common Foreign and Security policy has received less attention because 
of its non-legislative nature, where new scrutiny mechanisms generally do not apply. In 
Estonia and Finland, the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Riigikogu and the Eduskunta 
are responsible for scrutinising the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Their main 
scrutiny power is giving a mandate for the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the FAC 
meetings in Brussels and scrutinising the positions of the government. Both Foreign 
Affairs Committees have equal formal legal powers for parliamentary scrutiny in CFSP 
and similar ability in terms of resources and access to information. This also reflects in 
overall comparably high levels of parliamentary scrutiny compared to other EU member 
states. Yet the Finnish parliament uses these powers more effectively, which also amounts 
to higher ranks in different parliamentary scrutiny studies. This means that in practice, 
there is still a difference to be found. Explaining this difference in practice is what the 
present study set out to do.  
The purpose of this study was to find out which factors account for the difference, and 
especially, the relative weight of informal factors (attitude/willingness) in explaining the 
difference in the scrutiny of CFSP in practice of Riigikogu and Eduskunta. Moreover, 
using the analytical framework of Born and Hänggi of comparing authority, ability and 
attitude to see if difference in attitude (willingness of Members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee to scrutinise) accounts for the difference in levels of scrutiny between Estonia 
and Finland as their formal powers (authority and ability) do not differ significantly. My 
hypotheses were confirmed that the more parliamentarians conceive of their role as giving 
effect to parliamentary control and the more they are willing to exert parliamentary 
control, the higher levels of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. My research showed that 
indeed there is a difference in the attitude and willingness of the Members of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta and the Riigikogu to scrutinise CFSP and attitude 
and willingness is the identified crucial factor accounting for the difference in their levels 
of scrutiny of CFSP. It is a EU policy area that is considered intergovernmental as 
opposed to the Community sphere and thus Riigikogu and Eduskunta with a power to 
give a mandate and scrutinise the positions of the government have formal powers to 
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influence and shape the outcome of CFSP. My research has shown that in addition to the 
formal powers and abilities, it is also important to look at informal factors in researching 
parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. This research demonstrated that attitude and willingness 
of MPs influences if and how actively the parliamentarians engage in CFSP scrutiny as 
the mandate of the Riigikogu is more automatic and the mandate of Eduskunta is preceded 
by intense debate and active cooperation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
Also, my findings support assertions of the sociological institutionalist approach that 
emphasises the role of values, norms and role perceptions in determining the levels of 
parliamentary scrutiny. The Finnish members are more aware of their role as scrutinisers 
and see the role of national parliaments as a more important one in the formation of CFSP 
than Estonian MPs and are also more active in scrutinising the government positions. 
There is also a difference in the political culture as Finnish members of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have a much closer relationship 
and cooperation than their Estonian counterparts. In this light, it suggests further research 
into cultural and social variables. One avenue to do this would be to bring in also the third 
strand of new institutionalism, historical institutionalism with its emphasis on the impact 
of institutional identity and the impact of institutional culture on parliamentary scrutiny. 
This could contribute to explaining observed levels of role understandings. Although 
most of the earlier research on parliamentary scrutiny so far has concentrated on the 
rational choice institutionalism that sees MPs as rational actors motivated by maximising 
their interest through political games, this research has further demonstrated the 
importance of looking at sociological factors that better explain how national parliaments 
engage in scrutiny of CFSP and how the formal powers are used in practice. As the 
Foreign Affairs Committees work behind closed doors and there are concerns of 
democratic deficit, my research has also given insight into how national parliaments 
scrutinise CFSP.  
It also came out from the interviews that CFSP issues are more and more important for 
parliamentarians and also for their electorate with the conflicts and crises inside and 
outside Europe affecting directly or indirectly the populations of Estonia and Finland, 
which should give an incentive for parliamentary scrutiny. Especially considering the fact 
that the European Parliament has limited powers in this policy field. Although willingness 
of parliamentarians to engage in scrutiny is especially important in CFSP, also important 
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are the formal powers and the ability to use these. This is in line with the OPAL research 
that found a strong positive correlation between the institutional strength and level of 
activity of parliaments (Auel, Tacea, et al., 2015, p. 78). In the context of CFSP the 
attitude is especially important as scrutiny in this policy field is less automatic than in 
other policy fields.  
Overall the topic of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP needs more academic attention as it 
has been researched less than other EU policy fields, especially in the context of the 
double democratic deficit debate. Although this research has offered some insight into 
legislative-executive relations in CFSP, research on this policy field still lacks a 
systematic approach, especially on informal factors like attitude and willingness. Further 
studies are also needed on comparing countries with weaker formal powers and abilities 
and if the informal factors would still play a crucial role in engaging in CFSP scrutiny. 
As Estonia and Finland are both small countries, it should also be looked at if bigger 
member states engage differently in parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. Future research 
could also look more in depth at the importance of informal factors like attitude and 
willingness in the parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP and studies are needed with the 
involvement of more MPs and other countries. Especially as the European Parliament 
does not officially have much power in CFSP, but is very willing to be involved in its 
scrutiny and has succeeded in gaining more power informally in scrutinising it. The 
question that researchers are still working on is how to measure the actual influence or 
impact of the national parliaments on the decisions of the executive and on the EU policy 
outcomes. Although Eduskunta and Riigikogu are both considered strong scrutinisers due 
to their mandating system, it still remains to be researched if they actually have an ability 
to influence the actions and decisions of the government. This study has indicated that in 
order to achieve higher levels of scrutiny a change in the role conceptions of Members of 
Parliament is required.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Table of experts interviewed  
 
Name Position Country Time and place of the 
interview 
Anttila, Sirkka-Liisa 
(Centre Party) 
 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015-, 
Deputy Member 1993-1995, 
1991-1992 
Finland 26 January 2017, 
Strasbourg 
Eesmaa, Enn 
(Estonian Centre Party) 
 
First Deputy Speaker 2016-, 
Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2005-
2007, Deputy Chairman 
2003-2005, 2007-2016 
Estonia 23 February 2017, 
Tallinn 
Haavisto, Pekka 
(Green League) 
 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015-, 
1991-1994, 2007-2013, 
2014-2015, Deputy Member 
1990  
Finland 21 February 2017, 
phone 
Hanso, Hannes 
(Social Democratic Party) 
Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee in 2015 
Estonia 15 March 2017, 
Tallinn 
Huovinen, Susanna 
(Social Democratic Party) 
 
Deputy Member of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
2017-, 2011-2013, 2015-
2016, Member 2016-2017 
Finland 24 January 2017, 
Strasbourg 
Keerd-Leppik, Birgit Adviser/Head of Secretariat 
of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2001- 
Estonia 8 February 2017, 
Tallinn 
Kross, Eerik-Niiles 
(Estonian Reform Party) 
 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015- 
Estonia 25 January 2017, 
Strasbourg 
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Lahnalampi, Raili Chief of Cabinet of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2015-, Adviser of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2001-
2007, 2010-2015 
Finland 16 February 2017, 
phone 
Mihkelson, Marko 
(Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union) 
 
Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2016-, 
2011-2015, 2003-2005, 
Deputy Chairman 2005-
2007, Member 2007-2011 
Estonia 9 February 2017, 
Tallinn 
Packalén, Tom 
(The Finns Party) 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015- 
2011-2015 
Finland 25 January 2017, 
Strasbourg 
Põlluaas, Henn 
(Conservative People’s 
Party of Estonia) 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015- 
Estonia 14 March 2017, 
Tallinn 
Salolainen, Pertti 
(National Coalition Party) 
 
Deputy Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
2015-, 2011-2015, Chairman 
2007-2011, Member 1995-
1996 
Finland 3 March 2017, phone 
Šorin Marko 
(Estonian Centre Party) 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2016- 
Estonia 22 March 2017, 
Tallinn 
Tuomioja, Erkki 
(Social Democratic Party) 
 
Member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2015-, 
1991-1999, 1970-1978, 
Chairman in 1999, Deputy 
Member 2007-2011 
Finland 2 March 2017, phone 
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Appendix 2 
Semi-structured questions for expert interviews 
 
General introduction 
-How long have you worked at/been a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee? 
-General impression of the work of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Estonian and 
Finnish parliaments and similarities and differences. 
I block: The role of national parliaments in EU policy-making 
1. What is the role of national parliaments in the EU policy-making and how 
important is that role? 
2. Can national parliaments shape and impact the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union?  
(a) Can the Foreign Affairs Committee influence the outcome of the CFSP?  
3. What is the importance of EU matters for the Riigikogu/Eduskunta? 
4. What is the importance of EU matters for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Riigikogu/Eduskunta? 
5. What is the importance of EU matters and especially CFSP issues for the 
Estonian/Finnish population/electorate?  
II block: Parliamentary scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
6. What is the role of the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding EU matters?  
(a) How do you see your role?  
7. How does the Foreign Affairs Committee control the government in CFSP? 
8. Estonia/Finland has very strong formal scrutiny powers. Do you feel that the 
Foreign Affairs Committee is making the most of them in EU affairs and using 
them effectively?  
9. Does the current system have any flaws?  
(a) Are there any factors that hinder the Foreign Affairs Committee to scrutinise 
the government in CFSP? 
(b) Are the current scrutiny powers that your parliament has in CFSP enough? 
10. How do you feel that the Minister of Foreign Affairs sees his role in coming in 
front of the Foreign Affairs Committee before the meetings of the Foreign Affairs 
Council?  
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(a) What is the Minister’s attitude towards the Foreign Affairs Committee? 
11. What is the attitude of the Foreign Affairs Committee towards the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs when he comes in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee before 
the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council? 
12. Is there a difference in the scrutiny ability for a member of the opposition and a 
member of the coalition? 
13. How would the Foreign Affairs Committee react when the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs deviates from the mandate given to him in discussing CFSP?  
(a) Would there be any consequences?  
(b) How does the Foreign Affairs Committee control if the Minister has stuck to 
the mandate? 
14. How thorough are the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee before the 
Foreign Affairs Council meetings?  
(a) How long do they last on average? 
(b) Is there a lot of discussion about the positions of the government?  
(c) Are there often disagreements?  
(d) What are the division lines?  
15. What topics in CFSP have caused the most disagreement in the Committee? 
16. Does it ever happen that the Minister is replaced by a civil servant in presenting 
the positions of the government to the Foreign Affairs Committee before Foreign 
Affairs Council meetings?  
(a) How often?  
(b) What does the Foreign Affairs Committee think about it when the Minister 
does not come? 
17. What do you think is the reason that the parliament gives so much freedom of 
action to the government in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy?  
(a) Has the government itself taken on this position of leading in this field or has 
the parliament itself given away its powers voluntarily?  
III block: Academic literature and other actors in CFSP 
18. In the academic literature, there is a lot of talk about democratic deficit in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy because it has less parliamentary control 
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than other policy fields and supranational institutions play an influential role. Do 
you agree with it?  
19. In the academic literature, there is a lot of talk about information asymmetry 
between the government and the Members of Parliament. Government members 
attend the Council meetings and are better informed. Do you feel that there is 
information asymmetry?  
(a) Do you feel that the Foreign Affairs Committee has access to all the necessary 
information in order to exercise parliamentary scrutiny? 
(b) Does the Foreign Affairs Committee request information actively? 
20. Are there any other actors in addition to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs that have an influential role in shaping 
Estonian/Finnish positions in the CFSP? 
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Appendix 3 
Poolstruktureeritud ekspertintervjuu küsimused 
 
Üldine sissejuhatus 
-Kaua olete väliskomisjonis töötanud/liige olnud? 
-Üldmulje Eesti ja Soome parlamentide väliskomisjonide tööst ning sarnasustest ja 
erinevustest 
I teemaplokk: Rahvusparlamentide roll Euroopa Liidu otsustusprotsessides 
1. Mis on rahvusparlamentide roll Euroopa Liidu otsustusprotsessides ja kui oluline 
see roll on? 
2. Kas rahvusparlamendid saavad kujundada ja mõjutada Euroopa Liidu ühist välis- 
ja julgeolekupoliitikat?  
(a) Kas väliskomisjon saab mõjutada ÜVJP tulemust?  
3. Kui olulised on Euroopa Liidu asjad Riigikogule/Eduskunnale? 
4. Kui olulised on Euroopa Liidu asjad Riigikogu/Eduskunna väliskomisjonile? 
5. Kui olulised on Euroopa Liidu asjad ja eriti ÜVJK seotud teemad eesti/soome 
rahvale/valijatele? 
II teemaplokk: Parlamentaarne kontroll Euroopa Liidu ühises välis- ja 
julgeolekupoliitikas 
6. Mis on väliskomisjoni roll Euroopa Liidu asjades?  
(a) Kuidas näete enda rolli?   
7. Kuidas väliskomisjon kontrollib valitsuse tegevust ÜVJP valdkonnas? 
8. Eesti/Soome parlamendil on suured õigused parlamentaarse kontrolli 
teostamiseks, kas tunnete, et väliskomisjon kasutab neid õiguseid EL asjades täiel 
määral ja tulemuslikult?  
9. Kas praegusel süsteemil on puuduseid?  
(a) Kas on tegureid, mis takistavad väliskomisjonil parlamentaarse kontrolli 
teostamist ÜVJP-s? 
(b) Kas praegused õigused on piisavad parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks 
ÜVJP-s? 
10. Kuidas te tunnetate, kuidas välisminister näeb enda rolli väliskomisjoni ette tulles 
enne välisasjade nõukogu istungeid?  
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(a) Milline on tema suhtumine väliskomisjoni? 
11. Milline on väliskomisjoni suhtumine välisministrisse, kui ta tuleb komisjoni ette 
enne välisasjade nõukogu istungeid?  
12. Kas opositsiooni liikme ja koalitsiooni liikme võimalused erinevad 
parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamisel?  
13. Kuidas reageeriks väliskomisjon kui välisminister kalduks ÜVJP-s talle antud 
mandaadist kõrvale?  
(a) Kas sellel oleks tagajärjed?  
(b) Kuidas väliskomisjon kontrollib, kas minister hoiab mandaadist kinni? 
14. Kui põhjalikud on väliskomisjonis arutelud valitsuse seisukohtadest enne 
välisasjade nõukogu istungeid?  
(a) Kui kaua need keskmiselt kestavad? 
(b) Kas valitsuse seisukohtade üle on palju arutelu? 
(c) Kas eriarvamusi esineb sageli? 
(d)  Mis alustel poolt- ja vastupositsioonid jagunevad? 
15. Mis teemad ÜVJP-s on komisjonis kõige rohkem eriarvamusi tekitanud?  
16. Kas tuleb ette, et ministri asemel tuleb komisjonile valitsuse seisukohti esitama 
enne välisasjade nõukogu istungit ministeeriumi ametnik?  
(a) Kui sageli? 
(b) Kuidas väliskomisjon sellesse suhtub, kui minister ei tule?  
17. Mis te arvate on selle põhjuseks, et parlamendid annavad ÜVJP-s valitsusele nii 
palju tegutsemisvabadust?  
(a) Kas valitsus on ise võtnud juhtpositsiooni või on parlament vabatahtlikult oma 
võimust loobunud?  
III teemaplokk: Akadeemiline kirjandus ja teised tegurid ÜVJP-s 
18. Akadeemilises kirjanduses räägitakse ÜVJP kontekstis palju “demokraatia 
defitsiidist”, sest selle üle on parlamentaarne kontroll väiksem kui teiste 
poliitikavaldkondade üle ja riigiülesed institutsioonid mängivad mõjukat rolli. 
Kas nõustute sellega? 
19. Akadeemilises kirjanduses räägitakse palju informatsiooni asümmeetriast 
valitsuse ja parlamendi vahel. Valitsuse liikmed osalevad Nõukogu istungitel ja 
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on paremini informeeritud. Kas tunnete, et eksisteerib informatsiooni 
asümmeetria?  
(a) Kas tunnete, et väliskomisjonil on juurdepääs kogu vajalikule 
informatsioonile parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks? 
(b) Kas väliskomisjon küsib informatsiooni aktiivselt? 
20. Kas tunnete, et lisaks väliskomisjonile ja välisministrile on veel teisi, kes 
mõjutavad Eesti/Soome seisukohtade kujundamist ÜVJP-s? 
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EUROOPA LIIDU ÜHISE VÄLIS- JA JULGEOLEKUPOLIITIKA 
PARLAMENTAARNE KONTROLL: EESTI RIIGIKOGU JA SOOME EDUSKUNNA 
VÕRDLUS 
Liisi Vahtramäe 
RESÜMEE 
2009. aastal jõustunud Lissaboni lepingu üheks eesmärgiks oli rahvusparlamentide rolli 
suurendamine Euroopa Liidu (EL) poliitikate kujundamisel ja otsustusprotsessides, et 
vähendada nii-öelda demokraatia defitsiidi probleemi. Võrreldes teiste Euroopa Liidu 
poliitikatega on parlamentaarne kontroll Euroopa Liidu ühise välis- ja julgeolekupoliitika 
(ÜVJP) üle väiksem, kuna Lissaboni lepingus sätestatud uued parlamentaarse kontrolli 
mehhanismid ei rakendu sellele poliitikale ning selle koostöövorm on valitsustevaheline 
erinevalt riikideülestest poliitikatest ning liikmesriikide kujundada. Samuti mängivad 
suurt rolli liiduülesed institutsioonid nagu Euroopa välisteenistus. Kuigi 
rahvusparlamentide võimalused parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks ELi poliitikate üle 
erinevad märgatavalt ELi 28 riigi seas, siis mandaadisüsteemiga rahvusparlamentidel on 
olemas kõik vajalikud instrumendid teostada aktiivselt ÜVJP üle parlamentaarset 
kontrolli.  
Enne Euroopa Liiduga liitumist 2004. aastal võttis Eesti parlament Riigikogu eeskujuks 
Soome Eduskunna mandaadipõhise parlamentaarse kontrolli süsteemi, kus on 
rahvusparlamentidel suured formaalsed õigused parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks. 
Soome süsteemi eripäraks on lisaks Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjonile (Eduskunnas suur 
komisjon) valdkondlike komisjonide kaasamine ELi poliitikate parlamentaarsesse 
kontrolli. ÜVJP parlamentaarse kontrolli eest vastutab mõlemas parlamendis 
väliskomisjon, mille istungid on kinnised ja protokollid lakoonilised. Väliskomisjonid 
kuulavad enne välisasjade nõukogu istungeid Brüsselis välisministri ülevaadet valitsuse 
seisukohtadest ÜVJP teemadel ning annavad ministrile mandaadi. Akadeemiline 
kirjandus ÜVJP parlamentaarse kontrolli teemal peab mandaadisüsteemi 
rahvusparlamentide tugevaimaks instrumendiks parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks 
selle poliitikavaldkonna üle. Samas tundub, et Soome parlament kasutab neid õiguseid 
tõhusamalt, kuna Eduskunda nimetatakse ELi poliitikate parlamentaarse kontrolli 
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kontekstis poliitikakujundajaks, kuid Riigikogul on kummitempli maine ning nimetatakse 
“valvekoeraks, kes ei haugu” (Neuhold et al., 2016, p. 423). Uurimistöö eesmärk on 
võrrelda, kuidas Riigikogu ja Eduskunna väliskomisjonid teostavad parlamentaarset 
kontrolli valitsuse tegevuse üle ÜVJPs, pöörates erilist tähelepanu mitteformaalsete 
tegurite tähtsusele. Kuna selles poliitikavaldkonnas toimuvad arutelud ja otsustamine 
suletud uste taga, on üheks eesmärgiks ka näidata, kuidas rahvusparlamendid teostavad 
parlamentaarset kontrolli ÜVJP üle.  
Valitud teema on eriti aktuaalne Euroopa Liidu ühise välis- ja julgeolekupoliitika 
tugevdamise ja laiendamise debati taustal. Samuti on tegemist poliitikavaldkonnaga, 
mida on vähe uuritud ning mille parlamentaarne kontroll toimub reeglina suletud uste 
taga. Rahvusparlamentide väiksema kontrolli tõttu selles poliitikavaldkonnas on ka 
demokraatia defitsiidi oht suurem. Varasemad võrdlevad uuringud parlamentaarse 
kontrolli teemal on enamasti keskendunud formaalsetele õigustele kontrolli tugevuse 
hindamisel. Käesolev uurimistöö võrdleb Riigikogu ja Eduskunna väliskomisjoni 
parlamentaarset kontrolli ÜVJP üle, kasutades Borni ja Hänggi välja töötatud analüütilist 
raamistikku “pädevus, võimekus ja suhtumine”, mida nad kasutasid parlamentaarse 
võimu uurimiseks jõu kasutamise kontekstis rahvusvahelise egiidi all. See raamistik uurib 
lisaks formaalsetele pädevustele ka mitteformaalsete tegurite mõju nagu suhtumine ja 
valmidus teostada parlamentaarset kontrolli. Töös kasutati kvalitatiivset uurimismeetodit 
— poolstruktureeritud ekspertintervjuusid Riigikogu ja Eduskunna väliskomisjonide 
liikmete ja pikaaegsete ametnikega, et teada saada, mis motiveerib parlamente teostama 
kontrolli valitsuse tegevuse üle ÜVJPs.  
Uurimistöö tulemused näitasid, et Eduskunna ja Riigikogu väliskomisjonidel on sarnased 
formaalsed õigused ja võimekus teostada parlamentaarset kontrolli ÜVJP üle, kuid 
erinevad parlamendiliikmete suhtumise ja valmiduse poolest teostada parlamentaarset 
kontrolli. See näitab, et parlamentaarset kontrolli selles poliitikavaldkonnas uurides on 
küll oluline võrrelda formaalseid õiguseid ja võimekusi, kuid sama oluline on vaadata ka 
mitteformaalseid tegureid. Vaatamata sarnastele formaalsetele õigustele ja võimetele 
esineb erinevusi Riigikogu ja Eduskunna väliskomisjoni parlamentaarses kontrollis 
valitsuse tegevuse üle ÜVJPs. Uurimistöö tulemused näitasid, et see erinevus on tingutud 
Eduskunna liikmete paremast teadlikkusest oma rollist valitsuse kontrollijana ning nad 
tähtsustavad ka rohkem Euroopa Liidu poliitikaid ning rahvusparlamentide rolli Euroopa 
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Liidu otsustusprotsessis. Seetõttu on Eduskunna väliskomisjon ka aktiivsem 
parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamisel ÜVJP üle kui Riigikogu väliskomisjon. Istungid, kus 
arutatakse välisministriga valitusse seisukohti väliasjade istungil ja antakse mandaat, 
kestavad Eduskunnas rohkem kui poole kauem ning liikmete sõnul on tegemist aktiivse 
parlamentaarse kontrolli ja intensiivse debatiga. Riigikogu liikmed kirjeldasid mandaadi 
andmist, kui jutupunktide kuulamist ja enamus nentis, et sisulist arutelu ei toimu.  
Teoreetiliseks raamistikuks on uus-institutsionalismi teooriad. Varasemates 
parlamentaarse kontrolli uuringutes on kõige rohkem kasutatud ratsionaalse valiku 
institutsionalismi printsipaal-agent teooriat. See näeb parlamente ja parlamendi liikmeid 
parlamentaarset kontrolli teostamas ratsionaalsetel motiividel, kui see on nende huvides 
ning poliitiliselt kasulik. Ajalooline institutsionalism vaatab parlamentaarset kontrolli 
institutsiooni tugevuse kontekstis ning peab määravaks institutsiooni formaalseid ja 
mitteformaalseid faktoreid parlamentaarse kontrolli teostamiseks. Sotsioloogiline 
institutsionalism rõhutab poliitilise ja institutsionaalse kultuuri, rolli mõistmise ja 
institutsionaalse identiteedi tähtsust parlamentaarse kontrolli tugevuse määramisel. 
Käesolev uuring näitas, et ÜVJP parlamentaarse kontrolli kontekstis, mis erineb teistest 
ELi poliitikatest rahvusparlamentide väiksema rolli poolest ja kus ei mängi nii suurt rolli 
erakondade vahelised erinevused, on eriti oluline pöörata tähelepanu mitteformaaletele 
faktoritele. Sotsioloogiline institutsionalism selgitab kõige paremini käesoleva uuringu 
tulemusi keskendudes parlamendiliikmete rolli tajumisele, institutsionaalsele kultuurile 
ning Euroopa ja institutsionaalse identiteedi tugevusele. Samuti on see poliitikavaldkond, 
kus Euroopa Parlamendil on ametlikult piiratud õigused parlamentaarseks kontrolliks, 
kuid valmisolek ja huvi parlamentaarseks kontrolliks on suur ning nii on suudetud 
suurendada mitteformaalselt oma õiguseid.  
Käesolev uuring on esimene Riigikogu ja Eduskunna ÜVJP parlamentaarset kontrolli 
võrdlev töö ning panustab laiemasse debatti mitteformaalsete faktorite uurimise olulisuse 
üle ÜVJP parlamentaarse kontrolli kontekstis. Rahvusparlamentide roll selles ELi 
poliitikvaldkonnas väärib rohkem akadeemilist tähelepanu ja süstemaatilist lähenemist, 
eriti demokraatia defitsiidi debati kontekstis. Samuti on varasemad uuringud 
parlamentaarse kontrolli teemal keskendunud erinevustele liikmesriikide 
institutsionaalsete võimete vahel, kuid uurida tuleks ka, kuidas mõõta rahvusparlamentide 
reaalset panust või mõju Euroopa Liidu poliitikate tulemustele. Kuigi Riigikogu ja 
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Eduskunda peetakse mõlemaid mandaadipõhise süsteemi tõttu tugevateks valitsuse 
tegevuse kontrollijateks, on endiselt teadmata, kas nad ka tegelikult mõjutavad Eesti ja 
Soome valitsuste käitumist ja otsuseid ÜVJP valdkonnas.  
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